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Overweight (High-Conviction) The S&P software index caught a bid last week, led by heavyweight Microsoft (representing a bit more than 50% of the index) following a positive sell-side report that put a one-year price target implying a $1 trillion market cap. The basis for the (very) high expectations was Microsoft's dominant position in cloud computing and its rapid adoption in the marketplace; we are very much in agreement as we believe software spending is in the early days of an acceleration. CEO confidence, despite having peaked, remains near decade-highs, typically a precursor of greater software spending (second panel). Bank loan growth, another leading indicator of loosening purse strings, has just turned a corner (third panel). Our optimism is clearly shared by the analyst consensus view as earnings revisions have reached a seven-year high (bottom panel). Adding it up, we think more outperformance is in store for this technology subsector; stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5SOFT-MSFT, ORCL, ADBE, CRM, ATVI, INTU, EA, ADSK, RHT, SYMC, SNPS, ANSS, CDNS, CTXS, TTWO, CA, CDNS.
Feature Japan's economic experience in the post bubble era is often described as a fate to avoid at all costs. We would like to turn this common notion on its head. Rather than something to avoid, Japan's post bubble experience is a fate that other major economies should actively try to emulate, at least in parts. This report focusses on three specific lessons for European investors. Japan's so-called 'lost decades' describe the weak growth in its nominal GDP since the mid-1990s. But this emphasis on aggregate nominal income is grossly misleading. Standards of living do not depend on nominal GDP. What matters is real GDP per head combined with the absence of extreme income inequality. Real income must grow and this growth must benefit the majority, rather than a small minority. Since the late 1990s, the growth in Japan's real GDP per head has outperformed every other major economy (Chart Of The Week). And unlike other major economies, income inequality in Japan has not increased, remaining amongst the lowest in the developed world (Chart I-2). This is not surprising. Credit booms inflate bubbles in financial assets, which exacerbate income and wealth inequalities. Chart Of The WeekJapan Has Outperformed Everybody Chart I-2Income Inequality In Japan Has Not Increased Admittedly, the government has been running persistent deficits, but this is to counterbalance private sector de-levering. Total indebtedness as a share of GDP has not been rising. In the post credit boom era, Japan's real growth has come entirely from productivity improvements. Mankind's persistent ability to learn, experiment, and innovate produces more and/or better output from a fixed set of inputs. Unlike the unsustainable growth that is fuelled by credit booms and asset bubbles, real growth that comes from productivity improvements is sustainable. Genuine Price Stability: Something To Celebrate, Not Fear Japanese consumer prices are at the same level today as they were in 1992, meaning that Japan has experienced genuine price stability for two and a half decades (Chart I-3). But this is neither new, nor alarming - Britain enjoyed genuine price stability for two and a half centuries! At the height of the British Empire in 1914, consumer prices were little different to where they stood at the end of the English Civil War in 1651 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Japan Has Experienced Genuine Price ##br## Stability For Two And A Half Decades... Chart I-4...But Britain Experienced Genuine Price Stability For Two And A Half Centuries! Nevertheless, central banks continue with the deception that price stability means an inflation rate of 2%. This is clearly nonsense. Think about it - if prices rise by 2% a year, then your money will lose a quarter of its purchasing power every decade. And after a typical working life, your money will have lost two-thirds of its value.1 How exactly does that qualify as price stability?2 Still, we frequently hear a strong counterargument - in a highly indebted economy, inflation and growth in nominal GDP do matter. As debt is a nominal amount, it is nominal incomes that determine the ability to service and repay the high level of debt. So given a free choice, policymakers would prefer to have inflation at 2% rather than at zero; and nominal GDP growth at 3.5% rather than at 1.5%. Unfortunately, policymakers do not have this free choice. Contrary to what central bankers promise, inflation and nominal GDP growth cannot be dialled up or down at will to hit a point target. As we explained a while back in The Case Against Helicopters, inflation is a non-linear phenomenon which is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to point target.3 Look at the standard identity of monetary economics: MV = PT M is the broad money supply, V is its velocity of circulation, P is the price level and T is the volume of transactions. PT is effectively nominal GDP. The big problem is that both the broad money supply M and its velocity V - whose product determines nominal GDP - are highly non-linear. Chart I-5The Money Multiplier Is Non-Linear M is non-linear because the commercial banking system money multiplier - the ratio of loans to bank reserves - is non-linear. At a tipping point of inflation, the onus suddenly flips from lending as little as possible to lending as much as possible (Chart I-5). Admittedly, the central bank (in cahoots with the government) could by-pass the commercial banking system to control the money supply M directly. But it can do nothing to change the extreme non-linearity of the other driver of nominal GDP, the velocity of money V. Again, at a tipping point, the onus suddenly flips to spending money - both newly created and pre-existing balances - as fast as possible. At this point, nominal GDP growth and inflation suddenly and uncontrollably phase-shift from ice to fire with little in between. What is the Japanese lesson for Europeans? Simply that just like the BoJ, the ECB will keep moving the 2% inflation goalpost further and further into the future, as it realises the impossibility of achieving and sustaining the 2% point target. So even with inflation in the 1-2% channel, the ECB will create a loophole to exit NIRP and ZIRP very soon after it exits QE. This will structurally support the euro. Do Not Own Banks For The Long Term (Or Now) Japanese financial sector profits stand at less than half their peak level in 1990. For euro area financial sector profits which peaked in 2007, the interesting thing is that they are tracking the Japanese experience with a 17-year lag. If euro area financial profits continue to follow in Japan's footsteps, expect no sustained growth through the next 17 years (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Euro Area Financial Profits May Experience No Sustained Growth In a post credit boom era, banks lose the lifeblood of their business: credit creation. This loss becomes a multi-decade headwind to financial sector profit growth and share price performance. Bank profits are dependent on two other drivers. One is operational leverage - the amount of equity held against the balance sheet. More stringent European regulation will make this a headwind too. Banks will have to hold more equity capital against assets, diluting their profitability. The other driver is the net interest margin - the difference between rates received on loans and rates paid on deposits, effectively a function of the yield curve slope. However, this is a cyclical driver, and as explained last week in Market Turbulence: What Lies Ahead? this driver is unlikely to be positive in the coming months.4 What is the Japanese lesson for Europeans? Simply that euro area financials is not a sector to buy and hold for the long term. Rather, it is a sector to play during periodic strong countertrend rallies, albeit now is not the time for such a cyclical play. A Surge In Female Participation Chart I-7Sales Of Personal Products Have Boomed Over the past twenty years, Japanese sales of skin cosmetics and beauty products have almost tripled (Chart I-7). This has helped the personal products sector to outperform very strongly. The personal products sector is dominated by female spending. So it is significant that in 1995, the Japanese government introduced a raft of policies to encourage women to join the labour force: paid maternity leave, subsidised childcare, and paid parental leave for both parents. Today in Japan, both mothers and fathers can take more than a year of paid parental leave at an average rate of 60% of earnings. The policies had their desired effect. The proportion of Japanese women in the labour force has surged from 57% to 67%, while the male labour participation rate has held at 85%. Therefore, all of the growth in the Japanese labour force through the past twenty years has come from women. Europe tells a similar tale. Through the past couple of decades, parental leave policies have become steadily more generous. Unsurprisingly, the proportion of European women in the labour force has also surged from 57% to 67%, while the male labour participation rate has held at 78%. So just as in Japan, all of the growth in European labour force participation through the past twenty years has come from women (Chart I-8). But for the ultimate end-point in the European trend, look to the Scandinavian countries which have had generous parental leave policies since the 1970s. As a result, labour force participation for Swedish women is almost identical to that for men: 80% versus 83%. If the EU eventually reaches the Scandinavian end-point, it would mean another 20 million women in the EU labour force. What is the Japanese lesson for Europeans? While Japanese financial profits have halved since 1990, Japanese personal products profits have quintupled. Once again, the useful thing is that euro area personal product profits are uncannily tracking the Japanese experience with a 17-year lag (Chart I-9). If euro area personal product profits continue to follow in Japan's footsteps, expect them to almost triple over the next 17 years. Stay overweight the European personal products sector. Chart I-8A Surge In Female Participation Chart I-9Personal Products Profits Set To Grow Very Strongly Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Assuming you work for 50 years. 2 Admittedly, measured inflation probably overstates true inflation. However, estimates put this measurement error at no more than 0.3-0.5 percentage points. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'The Case Against Helicopters' published on May 5 2016 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report 'Market Turbulence: What Lies Ahead?' published on March 29 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* This week’s trade recommendation is to go long the Australian dollar versus the Norwegian krone. The profit target is 2% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights The U.S. and China have a roughly 60-day period to prevent the current trade "skirmish" from metastasizing into a full-blown trade war; The revised U.S.-Korea trade deal suggests that Trump's trade negotiators are credible and are targeting China, not U.S. allies; The U.S. will demand that China's recent RMB appreciation is backed by a long-term reduction in foreign exchange intervention; Tariff reciprocity is not significant, but market access and investment reciprocity are; China will offer concessions first, and will only go to a trade war if Trump imposes sweeping tariffs anyway; Short Chinese technology stocks; remain short China-exposed S&P500 stocks in expectation of further volatility. Feature The market is coming to terms with the fact that President Trump is willing to put his policies where his campaign rhetoric was, at least on trade policy. U.S. equities are down 5.7% since the White House announced Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum and 2.34% since it announced forthcoming Section 301 tariffs against China. Although we have cautioned clients since November 2016 that protectionism is a real risk to global growth and risk assets,1 we believe that the current set of U.S. demands on China justify the moniker of a "trade skirmish," rather than a full-out war.2 That said, the 5.7% drawdown is appropriate, if a bit sanguine. Our "trade skirmish" view is low-conviction. President Trump remains unconstrained on trade policy, giving him leeway to be tougher than the market expects. As such, it is appropriate for the market to price a 20%-30% probability of a full-blown trade war. Given that the market drawdown in such a scenario could be 20% or more, the current market action is appropriately pricing the worst-case scenario. Why would a trade war between the U.S. and China elicit a bear market in U.S. equities if a similar confrontation between Japan and the U.S. did not in the late 1980s? For three reasons. First, the overvaluation of stocks is much greater today. Second, interest rates are much lower, restricting how much policymakers can react to adverse risks. Third, supply chains are much more integrated today, globally and between China and the U.S. Nearly every major S&P 500 multinational corporation is in some way exposed to these supply chains. As such, we think the current drawdown is appropriate. That said, the administration's policy is not haphazard. President Trump and U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Lighthizer are on the same page, making China - and not NAFTA trade partners or South Korea - the main target of U.S. protectionism (Chart 1). The rapid pace at which the administration pivoted from global tariffs to targeting China gives a clear indication of what is afoot. The U.S. is using the threat of tariffs to cajole its allies into tougher trade enforcement against China (Table 1).3 We think this strategy can work, as outlined last week, but there is plenty of room for mistakes that could derail it. Chart 1China, Not NAFTA, In The Crosshairs Table 1U.S. Gradually Exempting Allies From Tariffs Trump also wants to change U.S. policy on immigration and could use the NAFTA negotiation to gain leverage over Mexico. There is therefore still some probability that Trump triggers Article 2205 to leave NAFTA, but we believe it has declined substantively since we put it at 50% in November, particularly given the U.S.-South Korea negotiations we discuss below.4 This week we take a look at the revised U.S.-Korea trade deal and what it suggests about the Trump administration's trade agenda more broadly. Then we update the status of the U.S.-China trade frictions, which are only temporarily subsiding, if at all. Lessons From The KORUS Talks The just-completed renegotiation of the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (the "KORUS FTA") offers some clues to the Trump administration's trade tactics that may be relevant for future negotiations with NAFTA partners, China, and others. President Trump has repeatedly criticized the KORUS FTA, as the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea has ballooned since its implementation in March 2012 (Chart 2). Trump used the threat of withdrawing from the deal to pressure South Korean President Moon Jae-in not to ease sanctions on North Korea too rapidly. Chart 2Why Trump Likes Tariffs Now USTR Lighthizer and his South Korean counterpart, Hyun Chong-Kim, have agreed to the outlines of a revised deal.5 The key points are as follows: Steel tariff waiver for Korea: South Korea will receive a country-level exemption from the U.S.'s recently imposed steel tariffs.6 Going forward, Korean steel exports will be subject to quotas equivalent to 70% of the average annual import volume during 2015-17. Greater market access for U.S. autos: Korea will double the number of autos it imports on the basis of U.S. safety standards, from 25,000 to 50,000 per year from each U.S. carmaker. It can import more subject to its own safety standards. It will refrain from any new emissions-standards tests, will accept U.S. safety standards on auto parts, and will ease ecological policies and the customs process of verifying the origin of exports. Delayed market access for Korean trucks: The U.S. will retain the existing 25% tariff on Korean trucks through 2041, instead of 2021 (Chart 2, second panel). Fair treatment of U.S. pharmaceutical imports: Korea promises not to discriminate against U.S. drugs but to grant them fair treatment under KORUS provisions. Ancillary currency agreement: The two sides appended a "gentleman's agreement" on currency policies, which is not a formal part of the deal and not subject to legislative confirmation. South Korea agreed not to devalue the won competitively, or to manipulate it more broadly, and to provide greater transparency regarding its interventions in foreign exchange markets. There are three main takeaways from the above. First, the U.S. is obviously focusing on non-tariff barriers to trade, the main hindrance to trade in a world with already low tariff rates. The grievances with Korea were primarily due to safety standards, environmental policies, and burdensome administration that hindered U.S. exports despite the reduction of tariffs under the KORUS agreement. Second, USTR Robert Lighthizer - the seasoned negotiator of the historic 1980s trade disputes with Japan, and the man in charge of the current NAFTA and China negotiations - deserves his reputation as a competent policymaker. He apparently makes concrete demands and is capable of compromising to conclude deals. This reduces the risk, overstated by the media, that the inexperienced U.S. president is driving the trade negotiations. Third, the U.S. is not deliberately trying to punish its allies in pursuit of some mercantilist fantasy of closing every single trade imbalance. Strategic logic dictated that Washington and Seoul needed to conclude a deal quickly so as to better coordinate on North Korea, and they did so. It is highly unlikely that the concluded deal will end the U.S. trade imbalance with South Korea, but it will likely improve it substantively. Moon Jae-in continues to be a pragmatist in his dealings with Trump and Trump is joining Moon's "Moonshine" policy of engagement with North Korea. Talk of the U.S. abandoning its allies did not materialize. (Japan and Taiwan are likely to get deals soon.) Most importantly, this deal is a strong indication that the U.S. will continue to pressure China on its foreign exchange practices. It would make no sense for the U.S. to require its allies to disavow competitive devaluation and reduce currency interventions while not demanding similar assurances from China. On this front, China's recent appreciation of the yuan will not ultimately satisfy the U.S., as it is arbitrary. The U.S. will need to extract deeper guarantees, with the implicit threat of tariffs to prevent China from backsliding. Otherwise the U.S. would yield Chinese exporters a foreign exchange advantage relative to American trade partners who agree to stop intervening to preserve a favorable exchange rate with the USD. A simple comparison of these countries currency moves over the past eight years reveals how they have allowed less appreciation relative to the U.S. than in trade-weighted terms, and how China would benefit if the others were forced to stop this practice while it was left off the hook (Chart 3). Chart 3The U.S. Will Demand Currency Appreciation This last conclusion fits with our study of previous cases of U.S. trade protectionism, in which the end-game was dollar depreciation relative to key trade partners.7 The KORUS case can be considered alongside Lighthizer's and the Trump administration's handling of the Section 301 investigation into China's forced tech transfer and intellectual property theft. The Trump administration came out swinging with unilateral 25% tariffs on about $60 billion worth of goods, to be listed on April 6 and enacted sometime in June. But it also signaled that it would allow a consultation period, and initiated a case through the World Trade Organization, thus reinforcing (rather than undermining) the global trading system. These developments give some grounds for optimism in the NAFTA negotiations and (less so) in the China negotiations. While China is preempting U.S. demands on its currency policy, it will be averse to providing any permanent guarantees, or to painful structural demands. This is due to its concerns about overall stability and its suspicion that the U.S. is pursuing a broader strategic containment policy against it. We discuss these issues below. Bottom Line: The preliminary conclusions of the KORUS FTA negotiation suggest that the Trump administration's trade leadership is credible, while Trump himself is looking for quick and concrete trade "wins" that can be presented to his domestic voter base. This is a marginally market-positive sign. But its ramifications are limited with regard to China, where strategic tensions and geopolitical competition will make it much harder to strike a similar deal quickly. U.S.-China: Fade The "Mirror Tax," Focus On Market Access And Tech China announced tariffs on roughly $3-$3.5 billion worth of U.S. goods on April 2 - ranging from fruits and nuts to wine and pork - in retaliation for the steel and aluminum tariffs that the U.S. imposed in March under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. China used the exact same tariff rates as the U.S. - 25% and 10% - while selecting the product list so as to produce roughly the same net trade impact in USD terms (Chart 4). The implication is that China will retaliate in kind to deter the U.S., but does not wish to "up the ante." This is largely what we expected, but the implication is significant: the U.S. is about to release a preliminary list on April 6 of $50-$60 billion worth of goods on which it will slap tariffs. This second round of tariffs - which is China-specific - follows from the probe under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. China's recent decision suggests that if negotiations fail, it will respond with tariffs worth roughly the same amount, which is a much bigger exchange of fire for these two economies. The actual retaliatory action would most likely occur in June, when the U.S.'s list is finalized and implemented, though China may hint at its product list much sooner, adding to trade fears and market volatility.8 The Trump administration claims that its product list will be chosen by an algorithm to maximize the impact on Chinese exporters while minimizing the impact on the American consumer. Consistent with this aim, some reports indicate that the goods will be advanced technological products set to benefit from China's "Made in China 2025" plan, in which China has laid down aggressive domestic content requirements (Chart 5). Chart 4Tit For Tat Chart 5China's High-Tech Protectionism What is the Trump administration's goal? Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin declared at the G20 finance ministers' meeting that he did not want to penalize Chinese imports so much as promote U.S. exports. Is this a credible basis for assessing the administration's policy? Yes and no. We think Mnuchin is telling the truth, but not the whole truth. When it comes to blocking imports or boosting exports, Mnuchin is right: the U.S. goal is not simply to punish Beijing for past unfair trade practices by blocking imports of Chinese goods. True, the Trump administration has focused on a lack of reciprocity in tariff rates. But a "mirror tax" or "mirror tariff" with China, which Trump has referred to, would not make much of a difference to the trade balance: Chart 6AThe U.S. Exports Soybeans And Cars To China Chart 6BChina Exports Phones And Computers To The U.S. Taking a look at the top ten exports of the U.S. and China to each other (Chart 6 A&B), it is quite clear that China imposes higher tariffs on U.S. goods than the U.S. imposes on Chinese goods (Chart 7 A&B). This follows from World Trade Organization rules and the relative level of economic development of the two countries. Chart 7AAmerican Exports To China Face Higher Tariffs... Chart 7B... Than Chinese Exports To America If we equalize these tariffs by raising U.S. tariffs to the same level as their Chinese counterparts for the same good, we wind up with a very small $6.2 billion gain to the U.S. trade balance (Chart 8). If we focus only on the top ten goods that both countries export to each other, and impose a hypothetical mirror tax, we wind up with an even smaller gain for the U.S. of $3.9 billion (Chart 9). This is small fry and cannot be the administration's goal (at least not its main goal). The real goal is to gain greater market access for U.S. exports in China. Here the U.S. may have a case, as China lags both its developed and emerging market peers in sourcing its imports from the U.S. (Chart 10). While China comprises 24% of total EM imports, it comprises only 15% of U.S. exports to EM. Even in commodity exports, where the U.S. has made major inroads in China, Beijing has recently limited the American share (Chart 10, middle panel). Chart 8Equalizing Tariffs Has Little Impact Chart 9Equalizing Tariffs Has Little Impact (2) Chart 10U.S. Grievance Is About Market Access A simple, back-of-the-envelope comparison of the U.S.'s top exports to China and EM ex-China suggests that the U.S. can make a case that its exports are suffering unduly in China: China's share of top U.S. exports is lower than one might expect it to be relative to EM or EM-ex-China (Chart 11 A&B). The U.S.'s market share of China's imports in key goods is lower than it is in EM or EM-ex-China (Chart 12 A&B). The U.S. share of China's top imports is smaller than the DM-ex-U.S. share (Chart 13 A&B). Chart 11AChina Is Not A Large Enough Share Of U.S. Exports (Broad) Chart 11BChina Is Not A Large Enough Share Of U.S. Exports (Detailed) Chart 12AU.S. Is Not A Large Enough Share Of Chinese Imports (Broad) Chart 12BU.S. Is Not A Large Enough Share Of Chinese Imports (Detailed) Chart 13AU.S. Has Less Market Access In China Than Other Exporters Chart 13BU.S. Has Less Market Access In China Than Other Exporters China has granted the legitimacy of U.S. complaints by pledging several times in the last few months to open market access. The latest news from the negotiations suggests that some progress is being made.9 Clearly the above is a very rough measure. Chinese consumers may not want to buy as much stuff from the U.S. as from Europe and Japan. The U.S. doubtless needs to improve its global competitiveness, and even then it may not gain as much market share in China as its DM peers. Nevertheless, Washington sees itself as the power that brought China into the global economy and allowed it to join the WTO. If China wants the U.S. to allow it to play a greater role in running the world, the U.S. is demanding a beneficial economic relationship in return. One way China is offering to deal with the problem is by buying American goods at the expense of U.S. allies' goods. For instance, Beijing has offered to buy more semiconductors from the U.S. and fewer from Taiwan and South Korea. This would alleviate the U.S. trade deficit a little, but at a greater expense to U.S. allies (Table 2). It would open up an opportunity for China to make more strategic acquisitions in those weakened, neighboring industries. It is not clear that the Trump administration will accept such a "concession," unless it is coupled with much greater concessions as compensation for selling out the allies. Table 2China's Trade Concessions To The U.S. Could Impose Costs On U.S. Allies Similarly, China's concessions that have been offered so far - like lowering the 25% tariff on car imports - are tokens in the right direction but not sufficient to satisfy the U.S. at the current juncture. This means that the U.S. will demand structural changes that increase market access, from a stronger RMB to a more consumer-oriented economy, as part of what will be a drawn-out effort to encourage China to rebalance its macroeconomy. Of course, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin was only telling half the truth: the U.S. also wants to prevent China from stealing too much of America's market share too fast. When we look at China's comparative advantage - the goods categories in which China's export growth has been fastest in recent years, weighted by contribution to the total - the U.S. is the country that has the largest global market share in these very goods (Chart 14). For instance, telecoms equipment, car parts, TVs, electrical circuits, etc. The U.S.'s export mix is not as dependent on these goods as that of China's neighbors (Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea), but it is the chief exporter of these goods nevertheless. Because many of China's most competitive goods are still low value-added (toys, plastics, textiles, furniture), China is pursuing tech upgrades, innovation, and intellectual property: it would eat away at the U.S. share of more advanced goods. Chart 14China's Comparative Advantage Threatens U.S. Global Market Share The Trump administration is trying to slow China's advance and put a stop to China's aggressive poaching of foreign tech and IP.10 This will include restrictions on Chinese direct investment and acquisitions to be announced by Mnuchin on May 21. We expect him to intensify an inherently stringent vetting process. The administration has already taken a proactive stance by blocking Canyon Bridge Capital Partners from acquiring Lattice Semiconductor and Singaporean company Broadcom's attempted acquisition of Qualcomm.11 Rumor has it that the administration is now considering invoking the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, which authorizes the president to take actions "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat." Trump would be able to cite China's use of state-backed companies, corporate espionage, and cyber-attacks in pursuit of technology and IP (Table 3). Table 3Trump Lacks Legal Constraints On Trade Issues... Especially When National Security Is Involved This is entirely aside from legislation pending in Congress, which the White House appears to support, that would provide the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) with the ability to block investments across entire industries, rather than on a case-by-case basis, and with a broader definition of national security and sensitive property and technologies.12 While American presidents have historically vetoed similar legislation against China, the Trump administration may not, depending on the outcome of talks. The key point is that the U.S. political establishment - across the spectrum - is alarmed about China's economic mercantilism. As Senator Elizabeth Warren recently declared to a group of top policymakers in Beijing: "Now U.S. policymakers are starting to look more aggressively at pushing China to open up the markets without demanding a hostage price of access to U.S. technology."13 Warren, a staunchly liberal senator from the Democratic stronghold of Massachusetts, is entirely on the same page as Trump. The takeaway for investors? China's tit-for-tat response to Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs should not be dismissed out of hand. The market is sensitive to trade fears and there is a clear avenue for them to get worse if the 60-day consultation period lapses without any major Chinese concessions. True, negotiations are ongoing and Trump's trade team has been shown to be both credible and willing to pursue trade disputes through the WTO. Nevertheless there are substantial measures aimed at China coming down the pike and the usual restraints on U.S. policy, centered on the U.S. business establishment lobbying policymakers, are not as effective as in the past. Bottom Line: The U.S.'s primary economic goal in the China negotiations is not to equalize tariffs but to open market access. The strategic goal is much larger. The U.S. wants to see China's rate of technological development slow down. As such, Washington will expect robust guarantees to protect intellectual property and proprietary technology. Investment Conclusions Several clients have asked about the constraints on the different players if trade conflict should escalate over the coming months. On the surface the U.S. is in a stronger position because its outsized deficit with China means that measures constricting bilateral trade are inherently more damaging to China's output (Chart 15). Even some of China's best retaliatory options are difficult to put into practice, including selling U.S. treasuries or imposing sanctions on U.S. commodities (Table 4).14 Chart 15China More Exposed To Trade Than U.S. Table 4China's Retaliation Options Are Limited... Even In Agriculture The U.S. also faces a constraint in imposing measures on China because manufacturing value chains today sprawl across various countries and multinational corporations. Tariffs therefore punish countries, including U.S. allies, that provide inputs to China or American companies that profit from them - think Apple. Moreover, tariffs will not in themselves change the U.S.'s fundamental savings-investment balance, suggesting that demand for foreign goods will simply shift to other producers and the trade deficit will be unaffected. However, supply chain risk is ultimately not prohibitive for the U.S. China has long ranked among the most exposed to supply-chain disruptions, while the U.S. ranks among the least (Chart 16). Moreover, U.S. allies in Europe and ASEAN stand to benefit if supply chains are rerouted from China (Chart 17). While the U.S. and allies would suffer higher initial costs as a result, they would gain the strategic advantage of reducing China's centrality to global supply chains. The latter has given Beijing an advantage in acquiring technology and moving up the value chain. Chart 16China Most Exposed To Supply-Chain Risk Chart 17U.S. Allies Benefit If Supply Chains Move While the Xi Jinping administration is weaning China off export reliance and U.S. reliance, the country still employs 28% of its workers in the manufacturing sector, which leaves it more exposed to disruptions than the U.S. if trade frictions should spiral out of control and weaken overall demand (Chart 18). While American workers are intimately familiar with the boom-and-bust cycle of free labor markets, China has not struggled with significant unemployment since 2003 (Chart 19). Its middle class was much smaller then. Chart 18Employment Is A Constraint On China Chart 19China Unfamiliar With Large-Scale Job Loss In short, China will first attempt to appease the Trump administration through market access (and keeping the RMB strong) to maintain its supply-chain centrality and overall stability. If Trump accepts China's concessions, trade frictions will not spiral out of control - at least not this year. China will only accept a full-fledged trade war if Trump rejects its concessions and imposes punitive measures that threaten its stability. At that juncture, Xi would probably find it useful to demonize Trump and execute long-term changes to make China more self-sufficient, blaming the U.S.-initiated trade war for the painful consequences. This is why it matters if Trump's demands go beyond foreign exchange rates, improved market access, and IP enforcement - for instance, if they extend to capital account liberalization, the holy grail of American trade negotiations with China. Thus far, Trump's team has not raised this demand, but it is a subject we will revisit soon as it is likely to be China's red line, at least within the economic sphere. In light of our expectation for further trade-war related volatility, we would recommend shorting Chinese tech stocks15 and remaining short China-exposed U.S. stocks. The latter trade has been in the black by over 5% in just a week, but is currently up only 0.7%. It is a way to hedge the risk of further tensions between U.S. and China. Risks to this view are: if the U.S. reduces the Section 301 tariffs that it is threatening on or after April 6; if Treasury Secretary Mnuchin's investment restrictions due on May 21 are watered down; or if the U.S. makes no structural demands on China's economy but merely accepts temporary RMB appreciation and some big-ticket import orders. Otherwise the risk that trade tensions spiral out of control will remain elevated at least through the U.S. midterm elections on November 6. By then, Trump will need either to have cut a small-scale deal with China that he can tout for voters or to have taken more aggressive trade action pursuant to the Section 301 findings. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Market Reprices Odds Of A Global Trade War," dated March 6, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated March 28, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 A 60-day consultation period with both legislatures will follow but the deal will probably remain in more or less the same form. 6 Aluminum was not included, but South Korea is not a major source of aluminum products for the U.S. 7 Please see footnote 2 above. 8 Please see David Lawder, "Trump to unveil China tariff list this week, targeting tech goods," Reuters, April 2, 2018, available at www.reuters.com. 9 Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin spoke with Politburo member Liu He, who is Xi Jinping's top economic policymaker, and they reportedly pledged that they are "committed" to a solution on reducing the U.S. trade deficit. The U.S. is asking for a $100 billion reduction to the trade deficit within the year, as well as some progress on intellectual property enforcement. Supposedly the specific demands involve reducing the Chinese tariff on car imports and raising the foreign ownership cap on Chinese financial companies, the latter of which China has previously promised to do. Please see Andrew Mayeda, "U.S. Pushes China On Cars And Finance In Tariff Talks," Bloomberg, March 26, 2018, available at www.bloomberg.com. 10 Please see the U.S. Trade Representative, "Findings of the Investigation into China's Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974," March 2018, available at ustr.gov. 11 In September 2017, the White House and Department of Treasury intervened in the attempt by a group of investors, including the state-owned China Venture Capital Fund, from acquiring Lattice, on the advice of CFIUS. Lattice makes computer chips that are highly versatile and can be used in military functions; the Chinese SOE was suspected of pursuing China's state-backed efforts to improve its semiconductor industry. Separately, in March 2018, President Trump blocked Singapore-based Broadcom's attempt to acquire Qualcomm, which would have been a hugely consequential tech merger due to the two companies' dominance in making processors. The Treasury Department feared that Chinese state entities might get access to Qualcomm's IP or that the merger might otherwise hinder Qualcomm's "technological leadership." Please see "CFIUS Case 18-036: Broadcom Limited (Singapore)/Qualcomm Incorporated," dated March 5, 2018, available at www.sec.gov. 12 Please see Andrew Mayeda, Saleha Mohsin, and David McLaughlin, "U.S. Weighs Use of Emergency Law to Curb Chinese Takeovers," March 27, 2018, available at www.bloomberg.com. 13 She was speaking with Liu He, seasoned diplomat Yang Jiechi, and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe. Please see Michael Martina, "Senator Warren, in Beijing, says U.S. is waking up to Chinese abuses," April 1, 2018, available at www.reuters.com. 14 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Ags Could Get Caught In U.S. Tariff Imbroglio," dated March 15, 2018, and "Oil Price Forecast Steady, But Risks Expand," dated March 22, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "After The Selloff: A View From China," dated February 15, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar
A return of volatility, spurred on by Fed tightening, caused an SPX pullback in February, and while the market pushed through that rough patch, it has since been replaced with fears of a trade war, exacerbated by musical chairs in the Trump administration. Despite shaky markets, our portfolio positioning has not changed and we remain firmly behind cyclicals over defensives, driven principally by our key 2018 investment themes: synchronized global capex growth (top and second panels) and higher interest rates on the back of a pickup in inflation (bottom panel). Still, the return of volatility warrants a review of our macro, valuation and technical indicators. The best combination in our review is S&P financials (Overweight) with an elevated and accelerating cyclical macro indicator (CMI), fed by both of our key capex growth and rising interest rate themes, combined with a modest undervaluation. The worst combination is S&P telecom services (Underweight, high-conviction), whose CMI recently touched a 30-year low as sector deflation hit acute levels. Valuations make the sector look cheap, but every indication is that telecoms are a value trap. Please see this week's Cyclical Indicator Update for more details.
Highlights Key Portfolio Highlights Our portfolio positioning remains firmly behind cyclicals over defensives, driven principally by our key 2018 investment themes: synchronized global capex growth (Chart 1A) and higher interest rates on the back of a pickup in inflation (Chart 1B). The positioning has been lifted by synchronized global growth and a soft U.S. dollar (Chart 1C), while the key risk to our portfolio of a hard landing in China looks to be mitigated (Chart 1D). A return of volatility, spurred on by Fed tightening (Chart 1E), caused an SPX pullback in February, and while the market pushed through that rough patch, it has since been replaced with fears of a trade war, exacerbated by musical chairs in the Trump administration (Chart 1F). Our buy-the-dip strategy remains appropriate on a cyclical time horizon (Chart 1G), given a dearth of evidence of a recession in the next year. SPX forward EPS estimates still show near-20% increases this calendar year (corroborated by our EPS growth model, Chart 1H) which should underpin outsized equity returns in the absence of a major valuation rerating. Still, the return of volatility warrants a review of our macro, valuation and technical indicators. The best combination in our review is S&P financials (Overweight) with an elevated and accelerating cyclical macro indicator (CMI), fed by both of our key capex growth and rising interest rate themes, combined with a modest undervaluation. The worst combination is S&P telecom services (Underweight, high-conviction), whose CMI recently touched a 30-year low as sector deflation hit acute levels. Valuations make the sector look cheap, but every indication is that telecoms are a value trap. Chart 1AGlobal Trade Is Rising... Chart 1B...But So Too Is Inflation Chart 1CA Weaker Dollar Is A Boon To Growth Chart 1DSoft Landing In China Seems Likely Chart 1EThe Return Of Vol May Spoil The Party... Chart 1F...And Policy Uncertainty Doesnt Help Chart 1GBuy The Dip Has Worked Out Nicely Chart 1HHeed The Message From A Booming EPS Model Feature S&P Financials (Overweight) Our financials cyclical macro indicator (CMI, Chart 2) has climbed to new cyclical highs with significant upward momentum, driven by broad improvement in virtually all of its underlying components. More than any other variable, rising yields and the accompanying higher price of credit are a boon to financials. Higher interest rates is one of BCA's key themes for 2018 and an ongoing selloff in the bond market bodes well for profits in the heavyweight banks sub-index and should deliver the next up leg in bank stocks performance (top panel, Chart 3). Another of BCA's key themes for 2018 is a global capex upcycle; higher demand for capital goods should drive outsized capital formation in the year to come. Our U.S. commercial banks loans and leases model echoes this positive outlook, pointing to the best loan growth of the past 30 years (middle panel, Chart 3). Lastly, a low unemployment rate drives both expanding consumer credit and much better credit quality. At present, the unemployment rate is testing all-time lows, sending an unambiguously positive message for financials profitability (bottom panel, Chart 3). Despite the much-improved cyclical outlook and a revival of overall animal spirits, our valuation indicator (VI) suggests that financials are modestly undervalued. At this point in the cycle, we would expect a modest overvaluation; the implication is that financials should be a core portfolio overweight. Our technical indicator (TI) has approached overbought levels several times over the course of this bull market, though history suggests it can stay at elevated levels for a considerable time. Chart 2S&P Financials (Overweight) Chart 3RS1 Rising Yields Are A Boon To Financials Earnings S&P Industrials (Overweight) Our industrials CMI (Chart 4) has gone vertical and is very near its all-time high. A combination of a supportive currency, a recovery in commodity prices and synchronized global growth are responsible for the rise. A falling U.S. dollar and capital goods producers' top line growth acceleration have historically moved hand-in-hand as this group is one of the most international of the S&P 500. The trade-weighted U.S. dollar has fallen by more than 10% from its most recent peak at the end of 2016 which suggests U.S. industrials should have a leg up in sales for the year to come (top panel, Chart 5). The slide in the U.S. dollar is coming at an opportune time; global growth is remarkably synchronized (and remains a key BCA theme for 2018) and has proven an excellent harbinger of industrials margins (bottom panel, Chart 5). Overall, an expanding top line and widening margins imply solid relative EPS gains. Our valuation gauge is near the neutral zone, where it has been for much of the past 3 years as the market has failed to capture the sector's outlook strength. Our TI echoes the neutral message, having unwound a significant overbought position at the beginning of last year. Chart 4S&P Industrials (Overweight) Chart 5Global Euphoria Should Lift Industrials S&P Energy (Overweight) Our energy CMI (Chart 6) has maintained its upward trajectory after bouncing off all-time lows last year. Importantly, the relative share performance does not yet reflect the drastically improved cyclical conditions, underpinning our overweight recommendation. Falling oil inventories and rising prices (top and second panel, Chart 7) combined with solid gains in domestic production underlie the CMI recovery. Our key themes for 2018 of a global capex expansion and synchronized global growth should be the most important drivers for energy stocks this year. With respect to the former, the capex intentions from the Dallas Fed survey hit their highest level in a decade, which usually presages domestic oil patch expansion and energy stock outperformance (third panel, Chart 7) With respect to global growth, emerging markets/Chinese demand is the swing determinant of overall oil demand, and non-OECD demand has been moving higher for most of the past year (bottom panel, Chart 7). Our VI has retreated far into undervalued territory, a result of the aforementioned failure of stocks to react to the enticing macro outlook. The TI too is in deeply oversold levels, suggesting that an oversold bounce could soon occur at a time when valuations are so appealing. Chart 6S&P Energy (Overweight) Chart 7Energy Share Prices Have Trailed Oils Recovery S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) Our consumer staples CMI (Chart 8) has turned up recently, following a two year decline. Strong employment gains and positive retail sales are the key pillars underlying the modest recovery. The euphoric consumer continues to push our consumer staples EPS model higher, now pointing to the best earnings growth of the past 5 years (middle panel, Chart 9). Overall industry exports are expanding at a healthy clip as a consequence of a softening U.S. dollar and robust European and rebounding emerging markets demand. Deflating raw food commodity prices are offsetting rising energy and labor input costs, heralding a sideways move to margins. Sell side analysts are also currently penciling in a lateral profit margin move (bottom panel, Chart 9). Investors have been vehemently avoiding staples stocks during the board market's uninterrupted run up, and have put our positioning offside. However, in the context of our cyclical over defensive portfolio bent we refrain from putting all our eggs in one basket, and prefer to keep consumer staples as our sole defensive sector overweight. Further, our VI is waving a green flag as consumer staples are now nearly two standard deviations below their 30-year mean valuation. Technical conditions too are completely washed out, signaling widespread bearishness, which is positive from a contrary perspective. Chart 8S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight) Chart 9Robust Consumer Confidence Bodes Well S&P Utilities (Neutral) Our utilities CMI (Chart 10) has spent the last decade in a long-term downtrend, albeit one with periodic countertrend moves. The key underlying factors are natural gas prices and relative spending on utilities, both of which have been retreating since 2008 (middle panel, Chart 11). Encouragingly, the sector's wage bill has slowed from punitively high levels, though pricing power has followed it down, implying muted margin changes (bottom panel, Chart 11). Like other defensive sectors, utilities have underperformed cyclical sectors in the last year; utilities equities trade as fixed income proxies, and a rising interest rate environment is punitive. As a result of the underperformance and relatively constant earnings, valuations have collapsed to the neutral zone. We reacted by booking solid gains and upgrading to a benchmark allocation earlier this year; synchronized global growth and higher interest rates are headwinds for this niche defensive sector and prevent us from lifting positions further. Our TI has fallen steeply over the past year and is now closing in on two standard deviations below the 30-year average. Chart 10S&P Utilities (Neutral) Chart 11Pricing Is Falling But Margins Look Neutral S&P Real Estate (Neutral) Our real estate CMI (Chart 12) has been in decline since its most recent peak at the end of 2016. This is confirmed by a darkened outlook for REITs; rents have crested while the vacancy rate found its nadir in 2016, suggesting further rent weakness on the horizon (top panel, Chart 13). Further, bankers appear less willing to extend commercial real estate credit, despite recent stability in underlying prices; declines in credit availability will directly impact REIT valuations (bottom panel, Chart 13). Our VI is consistent with BCA's Treasury bond indicator (not shown), indicating that both are at fair value. Our TI is starting to firm from extremely oversold levels, a positive indication for both 12- and 24-month relative performance. Chart 12S&P Real Estate (Neutral) Chart 13Peaking Rents and Tight Credit Are Headwinds S&P Materials (Neutral) Our materials CMI (Chart 14) has maintained its downward trajectory, largely due to the ongoing Fed tightening cycle. The heavyweight chemicals component of the materials index typically sees earnings (and hence stock prices) underperform as rates are moving higher (top panel, Chart 15). BCA's view remains that a sizable selloff in the bond markets is the most likely scenario in 2018, representing a substantial headwind to sector performance. Still, the news is not all negative. Exceptionally strong global demand growth has revitalized chemicals prices (bottom panel, Chart 15). Combined with the industry's relatively newfound restraint, capacity has not overextended and the resulting productivity gains bode well for earnings growth. Despite the improving outlook, valuations have been retreating for much of the past year and our VI has fallen back to the neutral zone. Our TI has been hovering near the neutral line for the past year, though a recent hook downward indicates a loss of momentum and downside relative performance risks. Chart 14S&P Materials (Neutral) Chart 15Rising Rates Are Offset By Improving Demand S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Our consumer discretionary CMI (Chart 16) has fallen back after reaching highs earlier in 2017, though remains elevated relative to the long term trend. Rising interest rates (top panel, Chart 17) are more than offsetting higher home prices and real wage growth, both have which have recently stalled. This rising short-term interest rate backdrop is not conducive to owning the extremely interest rate-sensitive equities that fall into the S&P consumer discretionary index. Both the household financial obligation ratio and household debt service payments have bottomed and are actually increasing. A higher interest rate backdrop will sustain the upward pressure on both and likely weigh on consumer discretionary relative share prices (third and bottom panels, Chart 17). This underpins our recent downgrade to a below benchmark allocation. Elevated valuations support our negative thesis as our valuation indicator has been rising recently out of the neutral zone. Our TI has fully recovered from oversold levels, and is now well into overbought territory, though historically this indicator has been excessively volatile. Chart 16S&P Consumer Discretionary (Underweight) Chart 17Higher Borrowing Costs Bode Ill For Consumer Discretionary S&P Health Care (Underweight) Our health care CMI (Chart 18) rolled over last year and has been treading water at these lower levels, driven by weak fundamentals in the key pharmaceuticals sector. Poor pricing power, a soft spending backdrop and a depreciating U.S. dollar have been pressuring the sector and keeping a tight lid on the CMI (top and second panels, Chart 19). Other non-pharma indicators are mixed as lower healthcare consumer spending is offset by a tick up in overall pricing power. Relative valuations have fallen deep into undervalued territory and are approaching one standard deviation below the 25 year average. Our TI too has reversed course and is well into oversold territory. However, the message from our health care earnings model is that sector earnings will continue to decelerate; this environment in not conducive for a sector re-rating (bottom panel, Chart 19). Chart 18S&P Health Care (Underweight) Chart 19Pharma Pricing Power Continues To Collapse S&P Telecommunication Services (Underweight) Our telecom services CMI (Chart 20), after moving sideways for much of the past decade, has recently fallen to a new 30-year low. Extreme deflation continues to reign in the beleaguered sector as relative consumer outlays on telecom services have nosedived (top panel, Chart 21) which is broadly matched by melting selling prices (middle panel, Chart 21) as demand contracts. This is reflected in our S&P telecom services revenue growth model, which remains deep in contractionary territory (bottom panel, Chart 21). The sector remains chronically cheap, exacerbated by the recent sell-off, and is currently as cheap as it has ever been. Still, given the brutal operating environment, we think such valuations have created a value trap. Our Technical Indicator has sunk but, like the VI, cycles deep in the sell zone have not proven reliable indicators that a relative bounce is in the offing. We recently downgraded the sector to underweight and added it to our high-conviction underweight list based on the factors noted above.1 Chart 20S&P Telecommunication Services (Underweight) Chart 21Telecom Services Remain A Value Trap S&P Technology (Underweight, Upgrade Alert) The technology CMI (Chart 22) has been falling for the past three years, driven by ongoing relative pricing power declines and new order weakness. However, the sector has proven resilient, at least until recently, as a handful of stocks (the FANGs, excluding the consumer discretionary components) and the red-hot semiconductor group have provided support. Still, market euphoria aside, tech stocks thrive in a disinflationary/deflationary environment and suffer during inflationary periods; inflation is gradually rising after a prolonged disinflationary period (bottom panel, Chart 23). Valuations, while still in the neutral zone, have reached their highest level in a decade. This may prove risky should inflation mount faster than expected; a de-rating phase in technology would likely follow. Our TI is extremely overbought, though it has been at this high level for several years. Chart 22S&P Technology (Underweight, Upgrade ALert) Chart 23Inflation Is No Friend To Tech Size Indicator (Neutral Small Vs. Large Caps) Our size CMI (Chart 24) has fallen back to the boom/bust line. Keep in mind that this CMI is not designed as a directional trend predictor, but rather as a buy/sell oscillator; the current message is neutral. Small company business optimism is near modern highs, as pricing and consumption vigor push domestic revenues higher (top panel, Chart 25). A smaller government footprint, i.e. fewer regulatory hurdles, and tax relief will disproportionately benefit SMEs. Earlier this year, we downgraded our recommendation on small caps vs. large caps to a neutral allocation, based on a deterioration in small cap margins and too-high leverage.2 Recent NFIB surveys would suggest this move was prescient; firms reporting planned labor compensation increases have steadied near a two decade high, while price increases are trailing far behind (middle panel, Chart 25). With "quality of labor" having overtaken "taxes" as the single most important problem facing businesses, labor compensation growth seems likely to continue moving up at an elevated pace and small cap margins should likely continue to trail large cap peers (bottom panel, Chart 25). Valuations have improved and small caps are relatively undervalued, though our TI echoes a neutral message. Chart 24Size Indicator (Neutral Small Vs. Large Caps) Chart 25Small Businesses Remain Exceptionally Confident Chris Bowes, Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Manic-Depressive?" dated February 12, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Too Good To Be True?" dated January 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Chart 1Inflation Pressures Mount Spread product underperformed equivalent-duration Treasuries for the second consecutive month in March. But last month's underperformance was different than February's in one important way. In February it was the fear of inflation and tighter Fed policy that prompted the sell-off in spread product. Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed Treasuries by 62 basis points, while the Treasury index provided a total return of -75 bps and TIPS outperformed nominals. In March, the sell-off in spread product coincided with Treasury returns of +94 bps and TIPS underperformed nominals. The negative correlation between yields and spreads re-asserted itself signaling that the sell-off was not driven by inflation, but by concerns about a potential slow-down in global growth. A severe slow-down in global growth is not imminent. But higher inflation and tighter Fed policy remain our chief concerns. With that in mind, core inflation printed higher again last month (Chart 1), and we think it is only a matter of time before our TIPS breakeven target range of 2.3% to 2.5% is met. That will trigger a reduction in our recommended allocation to corporate bonds. Stay tuned. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 91 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -81 bps. The sell-off of the past two months has returned some value to the investment grade corporate space, but spreads are still quite tight relative to history. The 12-month breakeven spread for a Baa-rated corporate bond has only been tighter 19% of the time since 1989.1 Our opinion of investment grade corporate bonds is unchanged. We continue to view value as relatively unattractive, and will reduce our overweight allocation once both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are above 2.3%. Corporate profit data for the fourth quarter of 2017 were released last week, and our measure of EBITD for the non-financial corporate sector grew at an annualized rate of 2.4%, slightly below the 3% annualized increase in corporate debt. Gross leverage for the non-financial corporate sector ticked higher as a result (Chart 2). In a recent report we showed that sustained periods of corporate spread widening almost always coincide with rising gross leverage.2 We also showed that while most leading profit indicators are still in good shape, a profit margin proxy based on the difference between corporate selling prices and unit labor costs is sending a warning sign. We expect profit growth to fall sustainably below debt growth later this year, driven by rising unit labor costs. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Chart 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 114 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -19 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 18 bps on the month and currently sits at 354 bps. The 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate ticked up to 3.56% in February, its highest reading since last July, but Moody's still expects it to decline to 1.96% during the next year. Based on the Moody's default rate projection and our own estimate of the recovery rate, we forecast High-Yield default losses of 0.97% for the next 12 months. This translates to a 12-month excess return of 257 bps for the High-Yield index versus Treasuries, assuming an un-changed junk spread (Chart 3). One hundred basis points of spread widening would lead to an excess return of -149 bps during this time horizon, and 100 bps of spread tightening would lead to an excess returns of +664 bps. However, such a large amount of spread tightening is probably over-optimistic. As inflation continues to rise and the Fed applies the brakes, a floor will likely remain under the VIX index of implied equity volatility and this will prevent junk spreads from recovering their cycle lows (top panel). We continue to await a firmer signal from our inflation indicators before reducing our allocation to high-yield. MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -39 bps. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread widened 7 bps on the month, split between a 4 bps widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS) and a 3 bps widening in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost). The widening in MBS OAS has not been as severe as the widening in investment grade corporate OAS. As a result, mortgages no longer appear cheap relative to investment grade corporates (Chart 4). But while the value proposition in mortgages is less alluring, we still see limited potential for spreads to widen during the next 6-12 months. Refinancing risk will remain muted as interest rates rise (bottom panel), and in past reports we showed that extension risk will likely be immaterial.3 In the structured product space, Agency MBS offer 11 bps less spread than Aaa-rated consumer ABS, but are supported by falling residential mortgage delinquencies and easing bank lending standards. In contrast, consumer credit (auto loan and credit card) delinquency rates have bottomed and banks have begun to tighten lending standards (see page 12 for further details). Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +2 bps. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 58 bps on the month, while Foreign Agencies underperformed by 38 bps and Local Authorities underperformed by 33 bps. Domestic Agencies outperformed duration-equivalent Treasuries by 6 bps, and Supranationals underperformed by a single basis point. USD-denominated sovereign bonds have performed worse than Baa-rated U.S. corporate bonds during the past six months, despite persistent weakness in the U.S. dollar (Chart 5). However, we do not think recent dollar weakness will provide much support for sovereign bond returns going forward. Rather, it is more likely that the U.S. dollar will appreciate during the next 6-12 months as the distribution of global growth shifts toward the United States. This month's issue of the Bank Credit Analyst discusses the cyclical and structural outlook for the U.S. dollar in detail.4 Elsewhere, Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities continue to offer attractive spreads after adjusting for duration and credit rating. We remain overweight those segments of the Government-Related universe despite an overall underweight allocation. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 56 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +29 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal/Treasury yield ratio widened 4% on the month, with short maturities performing somewhat worse than long maturities. The tax-adjusted yield for a 10-year municipal bond remains about 17 bps below the yield offered by an equivalent-duration corporate bond (Chart 6). As we have shown in prior research, investors typically get an opportunity to shift out of corporates and into munis at a positive spread differential before the end of the cycle.5 We will await this more attractive entry point before aggressively shifting our allocation in favor of munis. In a recent report we noted that state and local governments are still working to repair their budgets.6 More states enacted tax increases than decreases in fiscal year 2018 and the projected nominal budget increase across all states is a paltry 2.3%. Fortunately, our Municipal Health Monitor indicates that the hard work is paying off, and suggests that ratings upgrades should continue to outpace downgrades for the time being (bottom panel). Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve flattened in March, as long maturity yields fell quite sharply despite a small increase in yields out to the 2-year maturity point. The 2/10 slope flattened 15 basis points on the month and currently sits at 47 bps. The 5/30 slope flattened 7 bps on the month and currently sits at 41 bps. The trade-off between the pace of Fed rate hikes on the one hand, and the re-anchoring of long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation rates on the other will dictate the path for the yield curve during the next six months. Last month the Fed lifted rates for the sixth time this cycle, and signaled its desire to hike another 2-3 times before the end of the year. But just as further rate hikes will apply flattening pressure to the curve, the recent rebound in inflation will exert some offsetting steepening pressure. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate is still 25-45 bps below a range that is consistent with inflation being anchored around the Fed's target. We recommend a curve steepening trade for now, specifically a position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell, because upward pressure on inflation will make it difficult for the curve to flatten much further during the next few months. We will shift aggressively into flatteners once TIPS breakevens reach our target range. Further, the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is priced for 19 bps of 2/10 flattening during the next six months (Chart 7). In other words, the 2/10 slope needs to flatten by more than 19 bps for a long 5-year bullet position to underperform. We view this as unlikely. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 17 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +67 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 7 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.05%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 2 bps on the month and currently sits at 2.18%. As we explained in a recent report, we view the first stage of the bond bear market as being driven by the re-anchoring of inflation expectations.7 We will consider inflation expectations well anchored when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are in a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, where they were the last time that inflation was well anchored around the Fed's target. If the recent trend in realized inflation continues, then this re-anchoring could occur relatively soon. February data show that the annualized 6-month rate of change in trimmed mean PCE rose to 2.03% (Chart 8), and while the 12-month rate of change held steady at 1.7%, it will start to move higher in March when the strong inflation prints from January and February 2017 are removed from the sample. Pipeline measures of inflation pressure also suggest that inflation will head higher, as evidenced by our Pipeline Inflation Indicator, and in particular, the Prices Paid component of the ISM Manufacturing index which just hit its highest level since 2011 (panel 4). ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -19 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 2 bps on the month and currently sits at 44 bps, 11 bps above its pre-crisis low. While in prior research we highlighted that consumer ABS offer attractive spreads relative to many other sectors, we also pointed out that collateral credit quality is starting to weaken.8 With respect to value, Aaa-rated Consumer ABS offer a 12-month breakeven spread of 21 bps, while Agency MBS offer a spread of 6 bps and Agency CMBS offer a spread of 9 bps.9 However, household debt service ratios and delinquency rates appear to have bottomed for the cycle (Chart 9). While the pace of consumer credit accumulation remains robust, it has also moderated in recent months alongside rising delinquencies and tightening lending standards. We maintain a neutral allocation to ABS for the time being due to attractive valuation, but expect to downgrade in the future as household credit quality deteriorates. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 36 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +11 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 9 bps on the month and currently sits at 72 bps, close to one standard deviation below its pre-crisis mean. While a spread of 72 bps is still attractive compared to similarly-rated alternatives, we remain concerned about the gap that has emerged between CMBS spreads and the rate of appreciation in commercial real estate (CRE) prices (Chart 10). While bank lending standards on CRE loans are still tightening, they are tightening less aggressively than in recent years (bottom panel). This could eventually remove a headwind from CRE prices, but for now we view a position in non-agency CMBS as overly risky. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 22 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -14 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 6 bps on the month and currently sits at 47 bps. The Agency CMBS sector continues to offer an attractive spread pick-up relative to similar investment alternatives, and has historically exhibited low excess return volatility.10 Remain overweight. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.96% (Chart 11). While the fair value reading from our 2-factor model remains elevated for now, we expect it to fall once March Global PMI data are released this week. Based on a combination of final PMI data and Flash estimates for countries that have yet to report final March figures, we estimate that the Global PMI will decline to 53.8 in March from 54.2 in February. When combined with the most recent reading for dollar bullish sentiment, this gives a fair value of 2.85% for the 10-year Treasury yield. We will provide an official update to the model in next week's report, after the data are finalized. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 1, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.74%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 The 12-month breakeven spread is the spread widening required during the next 12 months for the bond to break even with a position in an equivalent-duration Treasury security. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Brainard Gives The Green Light", dated March 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Bank Credit Analyst, "U.S. Twin Deficits: Is The Dollar Doomed?", dated March 29, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Profiting From A Higher LIBOR", dated March 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 The 12-month breakeven spread is the spread widening required during the next 12 months for the bond to break even with a position in an equivalent-duration Treasury security. 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
Highlights In this Weekly Report, we present our semi-annual chartbook of the BCA Central Bank Monitors. When the chartbook was last published in September 2017, the main message was that less accommodative monetary policy was required in the developed economies. This was largely driven by solid global growth and diminishing economic slack visible in measures like falling unemployment rates and rising capacity utilization. Since then, there have been multiple rate hikes in the U.S., single rate increases in Canada and the U.K., and a slowing of the pace of central bank asset purchases in the euro area and Japan. No other central banks have made any moves, however, with inflation still struggling to return to policymaker targets in most countries. A new element that central banks are dealing with is the increased financial market volatility seen in 2018. Yet the BCA Central Bank Monitors continue to point to a need for tighter monetary policy in all countries (Chart of the Week). This means policymakers are unlikely to "come to the rescue" of less stable financial markets through more dovish (and bond bullish) policy without evidence that slower global growth was leading to an easing of cyclical inflation pressures. Chart of the WeekGreater Divergences Between Our Central Bank Monitors Now Versus 2016/17 Feature An Overview Of The BCA Central Bank Monitors Chart 2The Cyclical Backdrop Remains Bond Bearish The BCA Central Bank Monitors are composite indicators designed to measure the cyclical growth and inflation pressures that can influence future monetary policy decisions. The economic data series used to construct the Monitors are not the same for every country, but the list of indicators generally measure the same things (i.e. manufacturing cycles, domestic demand strength, commodity prices, labor market conditions, exchange rates, etc). The data series are standardized and combined to form the Monitors. Readings above the zero line for each Monitor indicate pressures for central banks to raise interest rates, and vice versa. Through the nexus between growth, inflation, and market expectations of future interest rate changes, the Monitors do exhibit broad correlations to government bond yields in the Developed Markets (Chart 2). Currently, the Monitors are above the zero line for all countries for which we have built the indicator. This implies that the conditions are not yet present to expect a period of declining global bond yields driven by more dovish central banks. Yet differences in the trajectories of the Monitors have opened up. The BoE, RBA and RBNZ Monitors have fallen well off their peaks, while the Fed, ECB, BoC and even the BoJ Monitors are all still at or close to recent highs. In each BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook, we include a new chart for each country that we have not shown previously. In this edition, we show the Monitors plotted against our 12-Month Discounters, which measure the expected change in interest rates over the following year taken from OIS curves. Fed Monitor: Market Turbulence Not Yet Enough To Change Fed Plans Our Fed Monitor remains in the "tight money required" zone, signalling that cyclical pressures are still pointing toward additional Fed rate hikes (Chart 3A). FOMC officials are now expressing strong conviction that the Fed's growth and inflation forecasts for 2018 will be realized, and even upgraded those projections last month. That increased confidence comes amid signs that core inflation is finally moving higher after last year's surprising slump (Chart 3B). Chart 3AU.S.: Fed Monitor Chart 3BNo Spare Capacity In The U.S. The growth and inflation subcomponents of the Fed Monitor have both accelerated since our last Central Bank Monitor Chartbook was published last September. In particular, the inflation subcomponent is on the cusp of breaching the zero line for the first time since 2011 (Chart 3C). The Fed Monitor (unlike the other Central Bank Monitors) includes a Financial Conditions component that is rolling over from very elevated (i.e. supportive) levels. Chart 3CSteady Pressure On The Fed To Tighten, But More From Growth Than Inflation The sharp sell-off in U.S. equity markets seen since early February is a development that would typically give the Fed pause on the need to tighten monetary policy further. Yet there are no real signs - yet - that any slowing of U.S. growth is in the cards for the next few quarters. Leading indicators are still climbing, employment growth has been accelerating in recent months, and both consumer and business confidence remain around multi-year highs. The Fed is likely to deliver on its projection of an additional 50bps of rate hikes in 2018, which is already discounted in money markets (Chart 3D). Additional increases beyond that in 2019 are still likely to occur, barring any signs that the current financial market volatility is altering the current rising trends in growth and inflation. Chart 3DThe Fed Will Continue To Hike In 2018 & 2019 BoE Monitor: Diminishing Pressures To Hike The Bank of England (BoE) Monitor is drifting lower, but remains in the "tighter money required" zone as it has since late 2015 (Chart 4A). Despite that persistent signal, the BoE has raised the base rate only once over that period - in November of last year. On the surface, inflation pressures remain strong. The U.K. unemployment rate is well below NAIRU with an output gap that is now estimated to be closed (Chart 4B). Yet realized inflation has peaked, largely because the British pound is now up 9% off the post-Brexit 2016 lows. Rapid declines in pipeline price pressures (PPI, imported goods price inflation) point to additional slowing of CPI inflation in the next several months. Chart 4AU.K.: BoE Monitor Chart 4BTight Capacity In The U.K. Meanwhile, the economic picture looks mixed. Leading economic indicators have rolled over, as have cyclical measures like the manufacturing PMI and industrial production. Yet at the same time, recent readings on both consumer and business confidence have shown modest improvement. Looking at the breakdown of our BoE Monitor, both the growth and inflation sub-components of the indicator are now falling (Chart 4C). Given the decelerating path of leading economic indicators, and with the currency-fueled rise in U.K. inflation now starting to reverse, we think the BoE will be hard pressed to deliver more than the 41bps of rate hikes over the next year currently discounted in U.K. money markets (Chart 4D). Chart 4CGrowth & Inflation Components Of The BoE Monitor Are Slowing Chart 4DThe BoE Will Not Deliver More Hikes In 2018 Than Currently Discounted We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Gilts, which continue to trade as a "defensive" lower-beta alternative to U.S. Treasuries and core European debt, within dedicated global government bond portfolios. ECB Monitor: Tapering? Yes. Rate Hikes? No. Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor has been grinding higher over the past couple of years and broke sustainably above zero in July 2017 (Chart 5A). The broad-based cyclical economic upturn in the euro area has continued to absorb spare capacity, with the unemployment rate for the entire region now down to 8.6%, right at the OECD's NAIRU estimate (Chart 5B). Chart 5AEuro Area: ECB Monitor Chart 5BEuro Area Economy Now At Full Capacity Despite strong growth, headline (1.1%) and core (1.0%) inflation remain well below the ECB's target of "just below" 2%. This lack of upward momentum flies in the face of the inflation subcomponent of our ECB Monitor, which has been steadily moving higher for the past three years (Chart 5C). Chart 5CRising Pressure On ECB To Tighten Monetary Conditions The ECB remains on track to deliver some of the monetary tightening that our ECB Monitor is calling for later this year, but it will not be through interest rate hikes (Chart 5D). ECB officials have made it clear that a tapering of asset purchases will take place when the current program ends this September. However, it will take more evidence that inflation will sustainably return to the ECB's target before rate hikes will commence. Chart 5DECB Will Deal With Tightening Pressures First By Tapering Asset Purchases The recent softening of cyclical euro area economic data like manufacturing PMIs, combined with underwhelming inflation prints, justifies the ECB's cautiousness on rates. Although leading economic indicators are still pointing to another year of above-trend growth in 2018. The likelihood of a taper later this year leads us to recommend a moderate underweight stance on core European government bonds, but with a neutral stance on Peripheral European debt which benefits from an expanding economy. BoJ Monitor: Still Far Too Soon To Expect Any Policy Changes The Bank of Japan (BoJ) Monitor has inched into the "tighter money required" zone for the first time since 2007 (Chart 6A), thanks largely to a robust economy. Yet while growth has been enjoying strong momentum, inflation remains stuck below the BoJ's 2% target - even with record low unemployment and a positive output gap (Chart 6B). Chart 6AJapan: BoJ Monitor Chart 6BJapanese Inflation Still Too Low Japanese businesses remain reluctant to boost wages despite robust profitability and a tight labor market. This makes it difficult for the BoJ to hit the 2% inflation target even using extreme policy tools like negative interest rates and asset purchases. Yet even these policies are approaching limits. Liquidity in the Japanese government bond (JGB) market is severely impaired with the BoJ now owning nearly one-half of all outstanding JGBs. This is the main reason why the BoJ shifted from targeting a 0% yield on the 10-year JGB back in September 2016, aiming to target the price of bonds purchased instead of the quantity. With both the inflation and growth components of our BoJ Monitor are now above the zero line (Chart 6C), a case could be made for the BoJ to consider raising its yield target on the 10-year JGB. In our view, any shift in the BoJ yield curve target will only happen if the yen is much weaker (the 115-120 range), core inflation and wage growth both hit at least 1.5%, and global bond yields hit new cyclical highs (i.e. the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield approaching 3.5%). Chart 6CGrowth & Inflation Pressures Have Picked Up In Japan We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Japan, as the BoJ remains a long way from signaling to the markets that interest rate expectations must begin to rise (Chart 6D). Chart 6DThe BoJ Will Not Signal Any Change In Policy In 2018 BoC Monitor: Still Following The Fed The Bank of Canada (BoC) Monitor has stayed above the zero line since the beginning of 2017 (Chart 7A). The BoC has hiked rates three times since last summer, with Canada's robust growth justifying the tightening of monetary policy. Real GDP expanded by 3% in 2017, enough to push Canada's output gap into positive territory and drive the unemployment rate (5.8%) to below NAIRU (6.5%). As a result, both headline and core inflation are now back to the midpoint of the BoC's 1-3% target range (Chart 7B). Chart 7ACanada: BoC Monitor Chart 7BNo Spare Capacity In The Canadian Economy Growth has cooled a bit recently, though, most notably in consumer spending and housing data. In addition, the inflation component of the BoC Monitor has slowed and is diverging from the rising growth component (Chart 7C). These developments may be a sign that previous BoC hikes are starting to have an impact, although overall GDP growth remains well above trend and leading economic indicators are not slowing. Chart 7CA Divergence In The Growth & Inflation Components Of The BoC Monitor Looking ahead, the Trump administration's rising protectionist rhetoric is a potential threat to both Canada's economy and the value of the Canadian dollar. However, Canada was exempted from the recent tariffs imposed on U.S. steel and aluminum imports, suggesting that Trump may only seek a renegotiation, rather than a tearing up, of NAFTA. We continue to recommend an underweight stance on Canadian government bonds. Only 51bps of rate hikes are discounted over the rest of 2018 (Chart 7D), a pace that can be surpassed if the BoC follows its typical behavior of following the policy lead of the U.S. Fed, which is still expected to deliver 2-3 more rate hikes this year. Chart 7DThe BoC Will Continue Its Hiking Cycle This Year RBA Monitor: Lagging Behind While our Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Monitor remains in "tighter policy required" territory, it has pulled back considerably over the past four months and is now near the zero line (Chart 8A). This move suggests that there is no imminent need to adjust monetary policy, given tepid inflation pressures. Despite the recent surge in employment growth, labor markets still have plenty of slack. Part time employment as a percentage of total employment and the underemployment rate are both near all-time highs. Wage growth is weak and a substantial recovery is unlikely given that real GDP growth slowed in Q4 and the output gap is still wide (Chart 8B). Chart 8AAustralia: RBA Monitor Chart 8BAustralian Inflation Remains Subdued Looking ahead, consumption is at risk. Real wage growth has been nonexistent, so households have supported their spending by reducing savings. However, the rate of increase for house prices has slowed and prices in Sydney actually declined in Q4. If overall house prices were to decline going forward, then the lack of a wealth effect boost would force already massively-indebted consumers to reverse the savings downtrend and cut spending. Both headline and underlying inflation remain below the RBA's target range of 2-3%, with policymakers expecting underlying inflation to reach 2% only in June of 2019 with just a gradual improvement in labor markets. The inflation component of our RBA Monitor has already declined significantly on the back of collapsing iron ore prices, softening survey-based inflation measures and cooling house prices (Chart 8C). Chart 8CThe Inflation Component Of The RBA Monitor Has Plunged As such, we maintain our overweight position on Australian government debt, as the RBA will not even deliver the one 25bp rate hike in 2018 currently discounted by markets (Chart 8D). Chart 8DThe RBA Will Not Deliver The Discounted Rate Hikes In 2018 RBNZ Monitor: No Inflation, No Rate Hikes Our Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Monitor, which was the most elevated of all our Central Bank Monitors in last September's update, has plunged sharply since then (Chart 9A). Inflation remains stubbornly below the midpoint of the RBNZ's 1-3% target range, even with a tight labor market and no spare capacity in the New Zealand economy (Chart 9B). Chart 9ANew Zealand: RBNZ Monitor Chart 9BNZ At Full Employment, But Inflation Peaking Both the growth and inflation sub-components have fallen sharply, with the inflation measure now down below the zero line (Chart 9C). A firmer New Zealand dollar, the flipside of the weaker U.S. dollar, has played a large role in dampening traded goods price inflation. Chart 9CStrong NZ Inflation Pressures, But Growth May Be Peaking The February RBNZ Monetary Policy Report expressed an optimistic view on growth supported by elevated terms of trade, population growth, fiscal stimulus and low interest rates. Headline CPI inflation, however, is not projected to rise back to 2% level until 2020. Unsurprisingly, the RBNZ is signaling no change in policy rates until then, even with the central bank projecting the New Zealand dollar to weaken in the next couple of years. We have been recommending long positions in New Zealand government debt versus other developed market debt since last May. New Zealand bonds have outperformed strongly over that period, as markets have priced in no change in rates from RBNZ (Chart 9D) unlike other countries where rate hikes were repriced and, in some cases, delivered. With the RBNZ on hold for at least this year and likely much of 2019, we our staying long New Zealand government bonds. Chart 9DRBNZ Will Stay On Hold In 2018 Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Recommended Allocation Due to the boost from U.S. fiscal stimulus, we do not expect recession until 2020. Despite some signs that growth is peaking, global economic fundamentals remain robust. Markets have wobbled because of the risk of trade war and rising inflation. We think neither likely to derail growth. Not one of our recession indicators is yet sending a warning signal. We are late cycle and volatility is likely to remain high (particularly if the trade war intensifies). But, given strong earnings growth and three further Fed rate hikes this year, we expect global equities to beat bonds over the next 12 months. Except for particularly risk-averse investors, who care mostly about capital preservation, we continue to recommend overweights in risk assets. We are overweight equities (especially euro area and Japan), cyclical equity sectors such as financials and industrials, credit (especially cross-overs and high-yield), and return-enhancing alternative assets such as private equity. Feature Overview Stimulus Trumps Tariffs Risk assets have been choppy so far this year, with global equities flat in the first quarter and the stock-to-bond ratio turning down (Chart 1). Markets were battered by worries about a trade war, signs of growth peaking, a rise in inflation, and bad news from the tech sector. This late in the cycle, with stock market valuations stretched and investors skittish about what might go wrong, we expect volatility to stay high. But the global economy remains robust - and will be boosted by U.S. fiscal stimulus - earnings are growing strongly, and the usual signs of recession and equity bear markets are absent. Though the going will be bumpy over coming quarters, we continue to expect risk assets to outperform at least through the end of this year. U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum and the threat of $50 billion of tariffs on Chinese imports so far represent a trade skirmish, not a trade war. The amounts pale by comparison with the positive impact coming though from U.S. tax cuts, increased fiscal spending, and repatriation (Chart 2). In history, fights over trade have rarely had a serious impact on growth. They flared up frequently in the 1980s, which was a period of strong economic growth. Even the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff increase of 1930 is now viewed by most economic historians as having played only a minor role in the collapse of trade during the Great Depression.1 Of course, trade war could escalate. China, as the biggest part of the U.S. trade deficit, is the White House's clear target (Chart 3). Japan in the 1980s, an ally of the U.S., agreed to voluntary exports restraints and to relocate production to the U.S. But China is a global rival.2 Chart 1A Tricky Quarter Chart 2Stimulus Tops Tariffs Chart 3China Is The Target For now, we expect the impact to be limited since some degree of compromise is the most likely outcome. President Trump sees the stock market as his Key Performance Indicator and would be likely to back off if stocks fell sharply. China knows that it has the most to lose in a prolonged fight. It might suit Xi Jinping's reformist agenda to boost consumption, cut excess capacity, and allow the RMB to appreciate modestly. While the U.S. has some justification for arguing that China's investment rules are unfair, China can also argue that it has made significant progress in recent years in reducing its dependence on exports, its current account surplus, and the undervaluation of its currency (Chart 4). But jitters will continue for a while. May could be a particularly tricky month, with the Iran sanctions waiver expiring on May 12, and the 60-day consultation period for China tariffs ending on May 21. Investors should expect that volatility, which in early January was remarkably low in all asset classes, should stay significantly higher until the end of this cycle (Chart 5). Chart 4...But Has Reduced Dependence On Exports Chart 5Volatility Likely To Stay High? Meanwhile, economic fundamentals generally remain strong. The Global Manufacturing PMI has dipped slightly from its cycle-high level in December, with recent currency strength causing some softness in the euro area and Japan (Chart 6). But the diffusion index shows that only three out of the 48 countries currently have PMIs below 50 (Egypt, Indonesia and South Africa). Consensus forecasts expect 2018 global GDP growth to come in at around 3.3%, similar to last year, and as yet show no signs of faltering (Chart 7). On the back of this, BCA's models suggest that global earnings growth will continue to grow at a double-digit pace for at least the rest of this year (Chart 8). Despite the strong growth, we see U.S. inflation picking up only steadily towards the Fed's 2% target.3 Jerome Powell in his first congressional testimony and press conference as Fed Chair showed no rush to accelerate the pace of rate hikes. We think the Fed is likely to hike four times, not three, but the market should not find this unduly hard to digest, as long as it is against a background of robust growth. Chart 6Dip In Growth Momentum? Chart 7Economists' Forecasts Not Faltering Chart 8Earnings Still Growing Strongly For the past year, we have highlighted a number of simple indicators we are watching carefully that have previously been reliable indicators of recessions and equity bear markets. Several have started to move in the wrong direction, but none is yet flashing a warning signal (Table 1, Chart 9). Table 1What To Watch For Chart 9No Warnings Flashing Here In February, BCA pushed out its forecast of the next recession to 2020, on the back of the U.S. fiscal stimulus. That would suggest turning more cautious on risk assets towards the end of this year - at which time some of these indicators may be flashing. But, until then we continue to recommend - except for the most risk-averse investors who care mainly about capital preservation and not about maximizing quarterly performance - an overweight allocation to risk assets. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President garry@bcaresearch.com Chart 10Not A Full Blown Trade War... For Now! What Our Clients Are Asking What Are The Implications Of U.S. Tariffs? Following recent announcements of tariffs on steel and aluminum and possible broad-based tariffs on Chinese imports, investors have started to worry about the future of global trade. But these moves should be no surprise since President Trump is merely delivering on electoral promises. From a macro-perspective, here are the key implications of rising trade barriers: An all-out trade war would certainly hurt U.S. growth, but a minor skirmish would have little impact. The U.S. is the advanced economy least exposed to global trade, which makes it harder for nations to retaliate. Running a large trade deficit, with imports from China representing 2.7% of GDP whereas exports to China are just 1.0% of U.S. GDP, gives the U.S. considerable leverage in negotiations. Additionally, the majority of Chinese imports from the U.S. are agricultural products, making it harder for China to retaliate with tariffs since these would raise prices for Chinese consumers (Chart 10). On the other hand, U.S. trade partners also have a case. With trade growth trailing output growth, other nations will be less willing to give in to U.S. threats. Additionally, unlike the Cold War era, when the U.S. had a greater influence on Europe and Japan, the world is moving toward a more multipolar structure. However, we do not believe nations will retaliate by dumping U.S. Treasuries, as that would deliver the U.S.'s desired end result of a weaker dollar. Chart 11Rising Wages Are The Missing Factor Finally, if tariffs lead to a smaller trade deficit and firms start to move production back to the U.S., aggregate demand will increase. And, given a positive output gap in the U.S., the Fed would be forced to turn more hawkish, ultimately forcing the dollar up. Equity markets do not like tariffs, and bonds will follow the path that real growth and inflation take. How the situation will develop depends on whether Trump embraces America's traditional transatlantic alliance with Europe and harnesses it for the trade war against China. If he does so, the combined forces of the U.S. and Europe will likely force China to concede. But if Trump goes it alone, a prolonged U.S.-China trade war could turn into a significant risk to global growth. How Quickly Will U.S. Inflation Rise? The equity sell-off in early February was triggered by a slightly higher-than-expected average hourly earnings number. In recent meetings, we find that clients, who last year argued that the structural pressures would keep inflation depressed ("the Philips Curve is dead"), now worry that it will quickly exceed 2%. And it is true that the three-month rate of change of core CPI has jumped recently (Chart 11, panel 1). Investors are clearly skittish about the risk of higher inflation, which would push the Fed to accelerate the pace of rate hikes. We continue to argue that core PCE inflation (the Fed's main measure) will rise slowly to 2% over the next 12 months, but we do not see it accelerating dramatically. Inflation tends to lag GDP growth by around 18 months and the pickup in growth from Q2 last year should start to feed through. This will be magnified by the 8% weakness in the US dollar over the past 12 months, which has already pushed up import prices by 2% YoY. What is missing, however, is wage pressure. Average hourly earnings are growing only at 2.6% YoY. We find that wage growth tends to lag profits by around 24 months (panel 2) and, since profits moved sideways for close to two years until Q2 last year, it may be a few quarters yet before companies feel confident enough to raise wages. Note, too, that wages have been weak compared to profits in this cycle. This is likely partly because of automation, but also because the participation rate for the core working population continues to recover towards its 2007 level, indicating there is more slack in the labor market than the headline unemployment data suggest (panel 3). Should Investors Still Own Junk Bonds? Chart 12Credit Cycle Still On The current late stage of the economic cycle has investors worried about the credit cycle and the outlook for corporate credit, in particular high-yield bonds. The number-one concern is stretched valuations. Spreads are close to all-time lows, which means investors should not expect significant capital gain. However, spreads can stay low for extended periods, especially in the late stages of the credit cycle. Junk bonds are a carry trade at this point, and investors can continue to pick up carry before a sustained period of spread widening sets in (Chart 12). A flattening yield curve is bad for junk returns, as it signals monetary policy is too restrictive. But, as inflation continues to trend higher, the curve is likely to steepen while allowing the Fed to deliver rate hikes close to its median projection. The key risk is a scenario in which inflation falters, but the Fed continues to hike. In this case a risk-off episode in credit markets would be likely, but this would be a buying opportunity and not the end of the cycle. Corporate balance-sheets have weakened, and logically investors should demand greater compensation to hold high-yield bonds. But spreads have diverged from this measure since early 2016. However, we expect improvements in corporate health since the outlook for profit growth is strong. However, a great deal of bond issuance has been used for share buybacks. If capital structures have less of an equity cushion, then recovery rates are likely to be lower when defaults do start to rise. Cross-asset volatility has returned. But credit spreads have remained calm thanks to accommodative monetary policy and easing bank lending standards. Also, stricter post-crisis bank capital regulations have mitigated the risk. Finally, the growing presence of open-ended junk bond funds and ETFs increases the risk that, once spreads start to widen, they will widen much more quickly than they would have otherwise. Who Should Invest In Hedged Foreign Government Bonds? In a recently published Special Report,4 we found that hedged foreign government bonds are a good source of diversification for bond portfolios. Hedging not only reduces the volatility of the foreign bonds, it reduces it so much that the risk-adjusted return ratio has significantly improved for investors with home currency in USD, GBP, AUD, NZD, CAD and EUR (Table 2). This is true across different time periods for most fixed income investors other than those in Japan, as shown in Chart 13. Table 2Domestic And Foreign Government Risk Return Profile (December 1999 - January 2018) Chart 13Domestic Vs. Foreign Treasury Bonds: Consistent Performance Across Time So the answer depends on investors' objectives and constraints: If investors are comfortable with the volatility in their local aggregate bond indexes, which are already a lot lower than equities, then investors in the U.S., the U.K., Canada and the euro area are better off staying home for higher returns without dealing with hedging operations. For Aussie, kiwi and Japanese investors, however, going abroad enhances returns. If investors focus on lower volatility, then all investors should invest a large portion of their portfolios overseas, with the exception of Japanese investors. If investors focus on risk-adjusted returns, then investors in Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., the U.K. and Canada are better off investing a large portion overseas. Global Economy Overview: Global growth remains robust, though momentum has slowed slightly in recent weeks. No recession is likely before 2020 at the earliest due to strong U.S. fiscal stimulus. Inflation will slowly rise towards central bank targets but there is little reason to expect it to accelerate dramatically, and so we see no need for aggressive monetary tightening. U.S.: Short-term, growth looks to have softened, with the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index turning down (Chart 14, top panel), and the regional Fed NowCasts for Q1 GDP growth pointing to 2.4%-2.7%. However, growth over the next two years should be boosted by the recent tax cuts and government spending increases, which we estimate will push up GDP growth by 0.8% in 2018 and 1.3% in 2019. Wages should start to rise from their current sluggish levels (average hourly earnings only up 2.6% YoY) given the tight labor market, which should boost consumption. Capex (panel 5) is likely to continue to recover due to tax cuts and a high level of businesses confidence. Euro Area: Growth has been steady in recent quarters, with Q4 GDP rising 2.5% QoQ annualized. However, lead indicators such as the PMI (Chart 15, top panel) have rolled over, probably because of the strong euro (up 6.2% in trade-weighted terms over the past 12 months). The effect has yet to be seen in exports, which continue to grow strongly, 6.2% YoY in February, but earnings results for Q4 surprised much less on the upside in the euro area than in the U.S. Chart 14Growth Robust, But Momentum Slowing Chart 15Strong Currencies Denting EU And Japanese Growth Japan: As an export-oriented, cyclical economy, Japan has also benefitted from better global conditions, with GDP rising by 1.6% QoQ annualized in Q4. However, like Europe, the stronger currency has begun to dent the external sector, with industrial production and the leading index slowing (Chart 15, panel 2). However, more encouraging signs are appearing domestically: retail sales rose by 2.5% YoY in January and part-time wages are up 2.0% YoY. As a result, inflation is finally emerging, with CPI (excluding food and energy) up 0.3% YoY. Emerging Markets: China's growth remains steady, with the Caixin PMI at 51 (panel 3). However, credit and money supply growth continue to point to a slowdown in coming months. This may be evident when March data (unaffected by the shifting timing of Chinese New Year) becomes available. Elsewhere in EM, growth has picked up moderately: Q4 GDP growth came in at an annualized rate of 7.2% in India, 3.0% in Korea, and even 2.1% in Brazil and 1.8% in Russia. Interest rates: A modest rise in inflation expectations (panel 4) has led to a rise in long-term rates, with the U.S. 10-year yield rising from 2.5% to almost 3% during Q1 before slipping back a little. We expect the Fed to hike four times this year, and think this will push up the 10-year Treasury yield to 3.3-3.5% by year-end. The ECB continues to emphasize that it will move only slowly to raise rates after halting asset purchases later this year, and we think the market has correctly priced the timing of the first hike for Q4 2019. We see no reason why the BoJ will end its Yield Curve Control policy, with inflation still well below the 2% target. Chart 16Cautiously Optimistic Global Equities Tip-Toeing Through The Late Cycle. Global equities experienced widespread corrections in the first quarter after a very strong start in January gave way to fear of rising inflation in the U.S., fear of slowing growth in China, and fear of rising geopolitical tensions globally. The return of macro volatility was so violent that it pushed the VIX to high readings not seen since 2015. Granted, a background of stretched valuations, complacency, and the "fear of missing out" also contributed to the market correction. The healthy correction of global equities from the high in late January has seen valuations contracting as earnings continued to grow at strong pace (Chart 16). BCA's house view is that global growth may be peaking, but should remain strong and above trend, underpinning decent earnings growth for the next 9-12 months. As such, we retain our pro-cyclical tilts in global equity allocations, overweight cyclical sectors and underweight defensive sectors; overweight high-beta DM markets (Japan and euro area); neutral on the U.S. and Canada; and underweight EM and Australia, the markets that would suffer most from a deceleration in Chinese growth. However, we are late in the cycle and valuations remain stretched by historical standards despite the recent correction. With macro volatility returning, investors should be very conscious of potential risks that could derail the uptrend in equities. For investors with higher aversion to risk, we suggest raising cash by selling into strength or dialing down the overweight of cyclicals vs defensives. Anatomy Of EM/DM Outperformance Since their low in early 2016, EM equities have outperformed DM in total return terms by more than 20%, of which 262 bps came in the first quarter of 2018, despite the rising volatility in all asset classes recently. As show in Chart 17, the outperformance of EM over DM has been dominated by three sectors: Technology, Financials and Energy. In the two-year period ending December 2017, over half of the EM outperformance came from the Tech sector, followed by Financials and Energy, accounting for 32% and 14% respectively. In Q1 2018, however, Tech's contribution dropped sharply to 0.3%, while Financials and Energy shot up to 51% and 33% respectively. Even though Energy is a relatively small sector, accounting for 6-7% of benchmark weights in both EM and DM, the diverging performance between EM and DM Energy sectors has played an important role in the EM outperformance. In the two years ending December 2017, EM Energy outperformed its DM counterpart by 32%, the same magnitude as the Tech sector (Table 3). In Q1 2018, EM Energy gained 7.6% while DM Energy suffered a 5.2% decline, resulting in a staggering 13% outperformance (Table 4). Chart 17Sector Contributions To EM/DM Outperformance Table 3Two-Year Performance Attribution* (December 2015 - December 2017) Table 4Q1/2018 Attribution* (December 2015 - December 2017) Country-wise, Brazil and China led the outperformance, helped by the Brazilian real's 30% appreciation against the U.S. dollar. BCA's EM Strategy believes that Brazilian equities and the real will both weaken given the country's weak governance and poor fiscal profile. Chart 18Style Performance We are neutral on Tech globally, and the general reliance of EM equities on Chinese growth, and the high leverage in EM do not bode well for EM equities. Remain underweight EM vs. DM. A Sector Approach To Style Year to date, the equal-weighted multi-factor portfolio has outperformed the global benchmark slightly, largely driven by the strong outperformance of Momentum and Quality, while Value and Minimum Volatility (MinVol) have underperformed (Chart 18, top three panels). This is in line with our previous regime analysis that indicated rising growth and inflation is a good environment for Momentum and Quality, but a bad one for Min Vol.5 As we have argued before, we prefer sector positioning to style positioning because 1) the major style tilts such as Value/Growth, Min Vol and Small Cap/Large Cap have seen significant sector shifts over time, and 2) sector selection offers more flexibility. As shown in Chart 18 (bottom three panels), the relative performance of Min Vol is a mirror image of Cyclicals vs Defensives, while Value/Growth is highly correlated with Cyclicals/Defensives. In a Special Report,6 we elaborated in-depth that sector selection is a better alternative to size selection, especially in the U.S. We maintain our neutral view on styles, and continue to favor Cyclicals versus Defensives. Given that we are at the late stage of the business cycle, investors with lower risk tolerance may consider gradually dialing down exposure to cyclical tilts. For stock pickers, this would mean favoring stocks with low volatility, high quality and strong momentum. Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight On Duration. Despite rising volatility due to changes in inflation expectations and uncertain developments in geopolitics, the investment backdrop has been evolving in line with our 2018 Strategy Outlook. Global growth continues at a strong pace (Chart 19) and our U.S. Bond Strategy has increased its yield forecast to the range of 3.3-3.6%, from 2.80-3.25% previously, reflecting both a higher real yield and higher inflation expectations. The U.S. 10-year Treasury yield increased by 34 bps in Q1 to 2.74%, still lower than our fair value estimate, implying that there is still upside risk for global bond yields. As such, investors should continue to underweight duration in global government bonds. Favor Linkers Vs. Nominal Bonds. The base case forecast from our U.S. Bond Strategy is that the U.S. TIPS breakeven will rise to 2.3-2.5% around the time that U.S. core PCE reaches the Fed's 2% target rate, likely sometime in 2H 2018. Compared to the current level of 2.05, this means the 10-year TIPS has upside of 25-45 bps, an important source of relative return in the low-return fixed income space (Chart 20). Maintain overweight TIPS vs. nominal bonds. In terms of relative value, however, TIPS are no longer cheap. For those who have not moved to overweight TIPS, we suggest "buying TIPS on dips". In addition, inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) in Australia and Japan are still very attractive vs. their respective nominal bonds (Chart 20, bottom panel). Overweight ILBs in those two markets also fits well with our macro themes. Chart 19Further Upside In Bond Yields Chart 20Favor Inflation linkers Corporate Bonds We continue to favor both investment grade and high-yield corporate bonds within the fixed-income category. High-yield spreads barely reacted to the sell-offs in equities in February and March (Chart 21). We see credit spreads as a useful indicator of recessions and equity bear markets and so the fact that they did not rise suggests no broad-based risk aversion. Moreover, this resilience comes despite significant outflows from high-yield ETFs, $4.4 billion year-to-date, almost completely reversing the inflows over the previous three quarters. We still find spreads in this space attractive. BCA estimates the default-adjusted spread is still around 250 basis points (assuming default losses of 1.3% over the coming 12 months) which, while not cheap, is less overvalued than other fixed-income categories (Chart 22). Investment grade spreads, however, have widened in recent weeks (Chart 21), with the rise concentrated in the highest-quality credits. This is most likely because investors see little value in these securities. We keep our overweight but we focus on cross-over credits and sectors where valuations are still reasonable, for example energy, airlines and insurance companies. Excessive leverage remains a concern for corporate bond losses in the next recession. BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (Chart 23) has improved in recent quarters, mostly due to stronger profitability. But the deterioration in interest coverage ratios in recent years makes companies vulnerable to higher rates. We estimate that a 100 basis point increase in interest rates across the corporate curve would lead to a drop in the ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses from 4.0 to 2.5.7 Sectors such as Materials, Technology, Consumer Discretionary and Energy appear especially at risk.8 Chart 21IG Spreads Have Widened, But Not HY Chart 22Junk Bonds Still Offer Some Value Chart 23Leverage Is A Worry For The Next Recession Commodities Chart 24OPEC Agreements Hold The Key Energy (Overweight): Demand/supply fundamentals have been driving prices in crude oil markets (Chart 24). Fundamentals remain favorable as strong global demand is keeping the market in physical deficit. However, the outlook for demand has turned cloudy as the market may start to price in the possibility of a trade war which would dent growth. Also, threats of renewed sanctions against Iran and deeper ones against Venezuela could potentially disrupt supply sufficiently to push up the crude price. Given rising uncertainties with the demand and supply outlook, we expect increased volatility in the crude price. We maintain our forecasts for the average 2018 prices for Brent and WTI at $74 and $70 respectively. Industrial Metals (Neutral): As President Trump moves ahead with protectionist policies, markets are being spooked by the possibility of a trade war. Looking past the noise, since China remains the largest source of demand, price action will follow domestic Chinese market fundamentals which are a function of how authorities handle a possible growth slowdown. The possibility of global trade disruptions, coupled with a recovery in the U.S. dollar, suggests increased price volatility. We are particularly negative on zinc. Spanish zinc has been flooding into China, depressing physical premiums and causing inventory accumulation (Chart 24, panel 3). Precious Metals (Neutral): Rising trade protectionism, geopolitical tensions, and diverging monetary policy will be sources of increased market volatility for the rest of the year. When equity markets went through a minor correction earlier this year, gold outperformed global equities by 6%. However, rising interest rates and a potentially stronger U.S. dollar are two headwinds for the gold price. We continue to recommend gold as a safe haven asset against unexpected market volatility and inflation surprises (Chart 24, panel 4). Currencies Chart 25Dollar Will Stage A Recovery Rally U.S. Dollar: Following its 7% depreciation last year, the greenback is flat year to date. A positive output gap and strong inflation readings are giving the Fed enough reasons not to fall behind the curve. Secondly, the proposed fiscal stimulus is likely to increase the U.S.'s twin deficits which has historically been bullish for the currency, as long as it is accompanied by rising real rates. Finally, speculative positions in the dollar are net short, which means any positive surprises will be bullish for the currency. We expect the U.S. dollar to stage a recovery rally in the coming months (Chart 25, panel 1). Carry Trades: Cross-asset class volatility is making a strong comeback. Carry trades fare poorly in volatile FX markets. High-yielding EM currencies like the BRL, TRY, and ZAR will underperform, whereas low yielding safe-haven funding currencies like the Swiss franc and Japanese yen, in countries with outsized net international investment positions, will be the winners. Finally, the return of volatility could hurt global economic sentiment and possibly weigh on growth-sensitive currencies like the KRW, AUD and NZD (Chart 25, panel 2). Euro: Analyzing the euro's strength, we see a 9% divergence in performance between the EUR/USD pair and the trade-weighted euro. Global synchronized growth was driven predominantly by a recovery in manufacturing which benefited the euro area more than the U.S. Also looking at history, the euro tends to appreciate relative to USD in the last two years of economic upswings driven by strong growth. Finally, the recent divergence in relative interest rates is a clear sign that other fundamental factors, such as the current account balance, have been exerting pressure. Sentiment and positioning remain extremely euro bullish, hence any disappointment with economic data will force a correction (Chart 25, panel 3). GBP: Since 2017, the pound has strengthened by over 16% vs. USD. An appreciating currency has dented inflation readings, thereby limiting the pass-through effects via the Bank of England hiking rates. A hurdle to further appreciation is negative growth in real disposable income and declining household confidence. Finally, weak FDI inflows will hurt the U.K.'s basic balance. Since the BoE will find it difficult to tighten policy much, we expect a correction in the next few months (Chart 25, panel 4). Alternatives Investors have been increasing their allocation to alternatives, pushing AUM to a record $7.7 trillion. We continue to recommend allocations through three different buckets: 1) among return enhancers, we favor private equity vs hedge funds; 2) favor direct real estate vs. commodity futures in inflation hedges; 3) favor farmland & timberland vs. structured products as volatility dampeners. But alternatives have a few challenges that require special consideration. Private Equity: Key drivers of returns have changed. In the past, managers were able to succeed by "buying low/selling high". But today, investors need to pick general partners (GPs) who can identify attractive targets and effect strategic and operational improvements. $1.7 trillion of dry powder. Global buyout value grew by 19% in 2017, but deal count grew by only 2%. High valuations multiples, stiff competition, and an uncertain macro outlook will force funds to be selective. Competition from corporate buyers. GPs are fighting with large corporations looking for growth through acquisition. Private equity's share of overall M&A activity globally declined in 2017 for the fourth year running. Competition for targets is boosting entry multiples in the middle-market segment. Hedge Funds: Net exposure for long/short managers has remained static over market cycles, which means investors pay too much for market exposure. But if we see market rotation or increased dispersion of single stock returns, this hedge fund group will benefit. Discretionary macro will benefit from differing growth outlooks, idiosyncratic events, and local rate cycles. Also, potential for more dispersion in the large-cap space and at the index level will benefit systematic macro. Event-driven funds have been hurt by deal-spread volatility as shareholder opposition, anti-trust concerns and political issues led to deal delays. But we continue to favor short-term special situations in less-followed markets such as Asia. Real Estate: After strong growth in capital values, driven by low rates and cap rate compression, investors need to focus on income-driven total returns. Additionally, income returns do not vary across markets nearly as much as capital value growth. Increase focus on core strategies. Look for properties in prime locations with long and stable lease contracts. Investors can also consider loans made to high-quality borrowers which are secured against properties with stable cash flows. Private Debt: With ultra-low yields, private debt offers attractive risk-adjusted return, diversification, and a potential cash flow profile ideal for institutional investors. However, it is critical to source a differentiated pipeline of opportunities. Infrastructure debt, with a long expected useful life, can provide effective duration for liability matching. Risk-adjusted returns can be enhanced by directly sourcing and structuring. Risks To Our View We see the risks to our main scenario (strong growth continuing through 2019, moderate inflation, late cycle volatility, and rising geopolitical risks) as balanced. There are a number of obvious downside risks, including an escalating trade war, a sharp upside surprise to inflation, and the Fed turning more hawkish (perhaps in an attempt to demonstrate its independence if President Trump pressures it not to raise rates). Among the risks less appreciated by investors is a slowdown in China. Leading indicators of the Chinese economy, particularly money supply and credit growth, continue to slow (Chart 26). Xi Jinping's recent senior appointments suggests he is serious about structural reform, which would mean accepting slower growth in the short-term to put China on a sounder long-term growth path. Linked to this, we also think investors are insufficiently concerned about the impact of rising rates on emerging market borrowers. If, as we expect, U.S. long rates rise to close to 3.5% over the next year and the dollar strengthens, the $3.5 trillion of foreign-currency borrowing by EM borrowers could become a burden (Chart 27). Chart 26What If China Slows? Chart 27Highed Indebted EM Borrowers Are A Risk Chart 28Presidents Like Markets To Rise Upside risk centers on a continuation of strong growth and dovish central banks. We may be underestimating the impact of U.S. fiscal policy. Our assumption that it will peter out in 2020 may be wrong, if President Trump goes for further stimulus ahead of the presidential election - the third and fourth years of presidential cycles are usually the best for stocks (Chart 28). Wages may stay low because of automation. In the face of this the Fed may stay dovish: it already shows some signs of allowing an overshoot of its 2% inflation target, to balance the six years that it missed it to the downside. All this could produce a stock market meltup, similar to 1999. 1 See, for example, Clashing Over Commerce: A History of U.S. Trade Policy, Douglas J, Irwin, Chicago 2017, chapter 8. 2 For an analysis of the geopolitical implications, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated March 27, 2018. 3 Please see the What Our Clients Are Asking: How Quickly Will U.S. Inflation Rise? on page 8 of this Quarterly Portfolio Outlook for the reasons why this is our view. 4 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Why Invest In Foreign Government Bonds?" dated March 12, 2018 available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Is Smart Beta A Useful Tool In Global Asset Allocation?" dated July 8, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Small Cap Outperformance: Fact Or Myth?" dated April 7, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Leverage And Sensitivity To Rising Rates: The U.S. Corporate Sector," dated February 22, 2018. 8 Please see also What Our Clients Are Asking: Should Investors Still Own Junk Bonds, on page 9 of this Quarterly Update, for more analysis of this asset class. GAA Asset Allocation
Highlights BCA expects consumer spending to remain supportive of above-trend economic growth in the U.S. in the next few quarters. Our view is that the 2018 outlook for both the U.S. economy and corporate profits remains constructive, but evidence is gathering that worldwide growth is peaking. Today's elevated levels of corporate leverage could intensify the pullback in business spending in the next recession. Housing is a reliable leading indicator of economic activity. Spending on new construction will enhance growth in the coming year, allowing the economy to expand at a pace well above its long-term potential. Feature U.S. equity prices rallied last week, although the NASDAQ lagged the broader indices. Despite the gain in the final week of the month, the S&P 500 finished lower in March. The back to back monthly declines in February and March were the first since September and October 2016. The 10-year Treasury yield fell last week, and credit underperformed. Oil and gold prices sold-off, but the dollar rose. Worries about global growth and a widening trade war were the key drivers, as investors looked ahead to Q1 earnings reporting season, which will kick into high gear next week. BCA expects global growth to be solid this year, although there are signs that growth is peaking outside the U.S. Moreover, the U.S. economy appears to be generating positive momentum, aided by housing and capex. This is why we expect 2018 to record strong EPS growth in the U.S., which will provide the equity market with a strong tailwind. That said, elevated levels of corporate leverage and low interest coverage ratios are a concern. Stay long stocks over bonds. We expect consumer spending to remain supportive of above-trend economic growth in the U.S. in the next few quarters. Household balance sheets are the best that they have been since 2007. Net worth is soaring and the aggregate debt-to-income ratio is close to record lows last seen at the turn of this century. Moreover, conditions that crushed the consumer ahead of the 2007-2008 recession are not in place and will not be for some time. Chart 1 shows that at 41.4%, household purchases of essentials as a percentage of disposable income are near an all-time low and have dropped by almost 2 percentage points since 2012. In contrast, spending on necessities rose by a record 3% in the five years ending 2008, matching levels reached at the end of the 1980s that reflected rising interest rates, surging inflation and soaring oil prices. Wrenching consumer-driven economic downturns ensued after both episodes. We see gradual increases ahead for both oil prices and interest rates, but nothing that would trigger the collapse of consumer spending. Furthermore, BCA forecasts only a modest rise in inflation and an acceleration in wage growth; both will boost disposable income. Meanwhile, U.S. inflation is heading higher. The core PCE deflator accelerated to 1.6% y/y in February, up from a low of 1.3% y/y in mid-2017. The coming months should see a further acceleration in inflation, in part due to the very soft base effects from last year (Chart 2). That said, one worrying point is that our diffusion index for the PCE deflator remains well below zero. This means that the inflation pick-up is not broad-based, but due to outsized gains in a few components. Core PCE inflation is usually decelerating when our diffusion index is below zero. Chart 1Consumer Is Not Stressed##BR##Despite Higher Energy Costs Chart 2BCA's Inflation Models Show Only##BR##Modest Acceleration Through Year-End Bottom Line: The Q1 weakness in consumer spending and GDP growth is unlikely to persist. A return to above-trend growth and inflation inching to the 2% target will keep the Fed on a path of gradual interest rates hikes. Animal Spirits Still Intact Our view is that the 2018 outlook for both the U.S. economy and corporate profits remain constructive, but evidence is gathering that worldwide growth is peaking. Investors may begin to question recent upward revisions to the growth outlook for this year and next. Globally, industrial production has softened and the manufacturing PMI has shifted lower in most of the advanced economies (Chart 3). Bad weather in North America and Europe in early 2018 may be partly to blame, but Korean exports - a leading indicator for the global business cycle - have also weakened. It is also disconcerting that some of BCA's measures of global activity related to capital spending are lower in recent months, including capital goods imports and industrial production of capital goods (Chart 4). Nonetheless, the G3 aggregate for capital goods orders remains in an uptrend, which suggests that it is too soon to call an end in the mini capital spending boom. Furthermore, our global leading indicators are not heralding any major economic slowdown (Chart 5). BCA's Global LEI continues to trend up and its diffusion index is above the 50 line. Chart 3A Downshift In##BR##Global Growth? Chart 4Some Measures Of##BR##Global Capex Have Softened Chart 5Global Leading Indicators Are Not##BR##Heralding A Major Economic Slowdown Turning to the U.S., the environment for continued robust capital spending is still in place. The Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017 will boost capex, although we note that business spending tends to climb faster in the 12 months before a corporate tax cut than in the year afterward.1 The caveat is that there have been only three corporate tax cuts in the past 50 years. Both BCA's real and nominal capex models, driven by surging capital goods orders along with elevated ISM data, roaring global exports and robust sentiment on business spending, indicate strong investment in plant and equipment in the next few quarters (Chart 6). CEO confidence reached an all-time high in 2018Q1. According to the latest Duke Fuqua School of Business/CFO Magazine Global Business Outlook (Chart 7, panel 1),"sixty-six percent of U.S. CFOs say corporate tax reform is helping their companies, with 36 percent saying the overall benefit is medium or large."2 Chart 6U.S. Capex Poised For Liftoff Chart 7CEO Confidence And Capex Plans Surging Surveys by the Conference Board and Business Roundtable show similar patterns (Chart 7, panel 1). Notably, the soundings on all three surveys climbed since Trump's election, but subsequently retreated as his pro-business agenda stalled during the summer. The dip in sentiment reflected the lack of legislative progress in Washington in the first 10 months of the Trump administration. The upbeat numbers in the regional Federal Reserve Banks' surveys of capital spending intentions further support escalating capex in the next few quarters. The average reading from the New York, Philadelphia and Richmond Feds' capex survey plans are at an all-time high in early 2018 (Chart 7, panel 2). Furthermore, the regional FRBs' capex spending plans diffusion indices are close to a cycle high, despite a modest pullback since last summer (Chart 7, panel 3). In addition, ABC's Construction Backlog indicator (CBI),3 a leading indicator that measures in months the amount of construction underway but not yet completed, hit a peak early this year, which suggests that 2018 is poised to be a strong year for nonresidential building activity (Chart 8). Moreover, architectural billings hit a new cycle high in Q4 2017(not shown). This signifies that investment in office, industrial and commercial space will accelerate in the coming year. However, there are some warning signs in the nonresidential construction portion of capital spending. Commercial real estate (CRE) prices have galloped to new heights (Chart 9, panel 1). Rent growth in all but the industrial buildings sub component of the U.S. CRE sector is starting to slow, suggesting that supply is slowly catching up with demand (Chart 9, panel 2) and that a slowdown in construction may ensue. Chart 8Nonresidential Construction##BR##Backlog At Eight Year High Chart 9Commercial Real Estate Prices Have##BR##Surpassed Pre-Recession Levels Corporate Health Fundamentals Last week's National Accounts (NIPA) corporate profit report allows us to update BCA's Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) (Chart 10). The level of the CHM improved slightly between Q3 and Q4, but the overall reading remains in 'deteriorating health' territory. However, the CHM moved slowly back toward "improving health" in 2017. The improvement in Q4 was broad-based, as five of the six components improved. Liquidity decreased slightly between Q3 and Q4. Leverage declined and interest coverage improved. Our CHM has a tendency to improve during phases of increased fiscal thrust.4 In contrast, corporate leverage increases substantially in the 12 months following a corporate tax cut. As an economic expansion enters the late stages, investors focus on where leverage pressure points may lurk. The Bank Credit Analyst's March 2018 Special Report5 on U.S. corporate vulnerability to higher interest rates and a recession raised some eyebrows. In a sample of 770 companies, we estimated how much interest coverage for an average company would decline under two scenarios: (1) interest rates rise by 100 basis points across the curve; and (2) interest rates rise by 100 basis points and there is a recession in which corporate profits tumble by 25% peak to trough. Given the number of client inquiries, we re-examined our results. We questioned whether our sample of high-yield companies distorted the overall results because it included many small firms and outliers. We are more comfortable with the results using only investment-grade firms, shown in Chart 11. The 'x' marks the interest rate shock and the 'o' marks the combined shock. Chart 10Corporate Health Improved In 2017 Chart 11Interest Coverage Is Deteriorating Nonetheless, the main qualitative message is unchanged. The starting point for interest coverage is low, considering that interest rates are near the lowest levels on record and profits are extremely high relative to GDP. This is the result of an extended period of corporate releveraging on the back of low borrowing rates. Chart 12 shows that the interest coverage ratio has declined even as profit margins remained elevated. Normally the two move together through the cycle. The implication is that the next recession will see the interest coverage ratio fare worse than in previous recessions. Rating agencies use many other financial ratios and statistics, but our results suggest that downgrades will proliferate when the agencies realize that the economy begins to turn south. Moreover, banks may tighten their C&I lending standards earlier and more aggressively because they also will be attuned to the first hint of economic trouble given the degree of corporate leverage in their portfolios. Recovery rates may be particularly low in the next recession because the equity cushion has been squeezed via buybacks, which will intensify widening pressures in corporate spreads. Tighter lending standards would generate more corporate defaults, even wider spreads and a more pronounced tightening in financial conditions. Therefore, corporate leverage could intensify the pullback in business spending in the next recession. The good news is that we do not see any other major macroeconomic imbalances, such as areas of overspending that could turn a mild recession into a nasty one. The market and rating agencies will ignore the leverage issue as long as growth remains solid. Indeed, ratings migration has improved markedly following energy-related downgrades in 2014 and 2015. An improving rating migration ratio is usually associated with corporate bond outperformance relative to Treasurys (Chart 13). For now, we remain overweight U.S. investment-grade and high-yield bonds within fixed-income portfolios. Chart 12Margins And Interest Coverage##BR##For Investment Grade Firms Chart 13Improving Ratings Migration##BR##Supports Our Credit Overweight Bottom Line: We are keeping an eye on our Corporate Health Monitor, bank lending standards, the yield curve and our profit margin proxy to time our exit from both corporate bonds and equities.6 We are also watching for a rise in the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate above 2.3% as a signal that the FOMC will get more aggressive in leaning against above-trend growth and a falling unemployment rate. The tightening labor market will continue to support the housing market, despite higher mortgage rates. Risks To Housing Are Limited Residential investment will add to growth in 2018. Inventories of new and existing homes are close to all-time lows (Chart 14). Housing affordability remains well above average and will remain supportive of housing investment even if rates climb by 100 bps (Chart 15). Recent soundings from the Fed's Senior Loan Officers survey shows that mortgage demand has ebbed in recent quarters (Chart 16). The housing sector has also benefited from a recovery in household formation in the past few years alongside the labor market and disposable income. Chart 14Housing Fundamentals##BR##Are Stout Chart 15Housing Affordability Under##BR##Various Rate Assumptions Chart 16Supply And Demand##BR##For Mortgages On that note, it is encouraging that the 10-year slide in the homeownership rate appears to have run its course (Chart 14, panel 3). Furthermore, U.S. real residential home prices are still below their 2006 peak. In addition, at under 3.9%, residential investment as a share of GDP remains well below the 12-year high of 6.6% achieved in 2005 (Chart 17, panel 1). It is difficult to see how residential investment can decline meaningfully when household formation is on the rise and home inventories are already low. Homebuilders appear to agree with this sentiment and report confidence levels near all-time peaks (Chart 17, panel 2). Employment in construction and related fields also suggests that the housing market remains on solid footing. (Chart 18, panel 1 and 2). Panel 3 shows that nearly 80% of states have escalating construction employment. This metric tends to lead construction jobs by a few months. Moreover, construction jobs tend to be at least coincident with housing construction. Segments of construction (residential and specialty employment) lead residential investment in some cases. Chart 17Real Home Prices Not Yet##BR##Back To Prior Peak Chart 18Housing Related##BR##Employment Trends Furthermore, the disconnect between the NAHB Housing Market Index and housing's contribution to economic growth (Chart 18, panel 4) also suggests housing is poised to lift off. Housing investment is the best leading indicator for real GDP growth among all sectors (Chart 14, panel 4). Construction of new homes and apartments, along with additions and alterations to existing stock, peaks as a share of GDP an average of seven quarters before the end of an expansion. Consumer spending on durable, nondurable and services reach a high, five quarters before GDP hits a zenith, while business capital spending tops out six quarters ahead of the economy. There are risks for housing despite the upbeat fundamentals. Banks have been tightening their lending standards in recent quarters, although they are still loose relative to previous cycles, and an overtightening may impede the real estate market (Chart 16). It is possible that the GOP's tax plan to significantly change the treatment of state and local real estate taxes and mortgage interest could also negatively affect housing demand, particularly in the luxury market. Additionally, rising foreign demand in certain U.S. markets may lead to mini-bubbles in coastal areas. The latest reading on the Case-Shiller home price index showed nominal housing prices climbing at the fastest rate in three years, although as noted above, inflation-adjusted house prices remain below prior peaks. A prolonged period of house price increases above income gains would challenge our sanguine view of housing affordability. However, the Fed and the banking system are hyper-vigilant about excesses in the housing market, therefore, it is unlikely that another housing bubble will be tolerated. Bottom Line: Housing is a reliable leading indicator of economic activity. Spending on new construction will enhance growth in the coming year, allowing the economy to expand at a pace well above its long-term potential. Faster GDP growth will be accompanied by higher inflation and a more active Fed, especially relative to current market expectations. BCA expects global growth to be solid this year although there are signs that growth is peaking outside the U.S. Moreover, the U.S. economy appears to be generating positive momentum even before the effects of tax cuts fully kick in. This is why we expect 2018 to record strong EPS growth in the U.S., which will provide the equity market with a strong tailwind. Stay long stocks over bonds. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Opportunity," dated December 11, 2017, available at usis.bca.research.com. 2 http://www.cfosurvey.org/2018q1/press-release.html 3 https://www.abc.org/News-Media/Construction-Economics/Construction-Backlog-Indicator/entryid/13680/abc-s-construction-backlog-indicator-hits-a-new-high-2018-poised-to-be-a-very-strong-year-for-construction-spending 4 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Opportunity," dated December 11, 2017, available at usis.bca.research.com. 5 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, dated February 22, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, dated February 22, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com.